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Abstract 
In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content 
externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an 
epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. 
Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward 
two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement 
and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be 
reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, 
and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this 
dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and 
show how none of them are adequate. 
In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how 
externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the 
incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. 
In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally 
that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together 
establish hi s compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our 
judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our 
judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument 
for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but 
non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we 
possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. 
In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good 
reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is 
because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot 
establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is 
that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism 
and self-knowledge are compatible. 
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Introduction 
Over the course of this dissertation I will present my argument for why the compatibility 
of content externalism with a privileged self-knowledge has not yet been established. 
In Chapter I, I explain the notions of "privileged self-knowledge" and "content 
externalism", and demonstrate why there is a prima facie concern over whether they can 
be understood to be compatible. I articulate the two major problems that incompatibilists 
have used to present this worry, and sketch the compatibilist responses to these problems. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the compatibilist responses in a little more detail. Of the 
available responses, I argue that Burge's is the most plausible . 
In Chapter 3 I argue that Burge's solution does not provide any reason to think 
that our judgements about our thoughts count as knowledge, rather than belief, if 
externalism is true. The argument Burge provides, I argue, demonstrates that we do 
indeed possess self-knowledge, but in order to establish a robust compatibilism on this 
matter, Burge needs to give an answer to the above question as well. This he does not do, 
and I thus conclude that it is to the providing of this sort of reason, or to examining the 
prospects of a non-externalistic account of mental content, that the debate should 
proceed. 
Chapter 1 
In this first chapter, my aim is to set up the debate regarding the compatibility of content 
externalism with an understanding of self-knowledge entailing that we have any kind of 
privileged access, or special authority, when it comes to knowing what we ourselves are 
thinking. I will proceed as follows: In the first section, I will explain what is meant or 
entailed by this sort of privileged self-knowledge (henceforth, self-knowledge) and by 
content externalism (henceforth , externalism). I will show that there is prima facie reason 
to suppose externalism is incompatible with self-knowledge. In the second section, I will 
sketch what I understand to be the two major problems that philosophers have relied upon 
to argue that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. [ call these, following 
Martin Davies (2000), the Achievement Problem and the Consequence Problem. [n my 
analysis, I will also draw out what these problems imply about knowledge in general. In 
the third section, I will examine why this debate is significant, and also what precisely 
would be required in an adequate solution to these problems. In the fourth section, I will 
sketch the various avenues of response to these problems, also drawing out the 
implications. By the end of this chapter, I hope to have established more clearly what is at 
stake in this debate, and what options philosophers seeking to establish the compatibility 
of se lf-knowledge and externalism (compatibilists) have available. 
<n Self-Knowledge and Externalism 
What is meant by self-knowledge must be understood generally; there are various theories 
of self-knowledge available that understand our access to our own thoughts to be 
epistemically privileged in some way. At this stage I will not commit myself to any 
particular view. [n Chapter 2, in my criticism of some compatibilist arguments, I will 
argue for a more particular understanding of self-knowledge, but I will not get into this 
yet. Put broadly, self-knowledge is understood to be different from our knowledge of the 
external world, in that it is epistemically privileged, as well as direct and non-inferential. 
We can come to know what we occurrently believe, without having to provide or 
have available any evidence that would support this claim. When we make judgements 
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about what other people believe, we will have to pay attention to, and cite, behavioural 
evidence, things that this person has said or done. We do not need to cite such evidence 
in support of our judgements about our own occurrent beliefs. This is something it does 
not normally make sense to ask of someone. Further, it is understood that our judgements 
about our own beliefs are more reliable than our judgements about other people' s beliefs. 
Our access to our own mental states is in this sense privileged - we can better know what 
we occurrently believe than anyone else can. In explaining self-knowledge in this way, 
there are thus two aspects that must be noted: first, our access to our own thoughts is 
generally more reliable than the access other people have to our thoughts . There may be 
cases where some other person - perhaps a psychologist - may be better placed to tell us 
what we are thinking than we are. However, it must be acknowledged that such cases are 
rare or unusual - usually we are better placed than anyone else to judge what we are 
thinking, and while there may be many thoughts we are unaware of, there are also many 
thoughts that we are knowledgeably aware of as well. The presence of unconscious 
desires and beliefs, or self-deception, does not detract from my ability to judge accurately 
and knowledgeably about many other of my beliefs and desires. I believe right now that 
the sun is shining outside my window, and I know I believe this. The presence of the 
unconscious, or even self-deception, ought not detract from my ability to know that right 
now, I believe that the sun is shining. The notion of epistemically privi leged access at 
work in this debate is thus to be understood as being compatible with self-deception, and 
with holding that we have many thoughts of which we are entirely unaware, and with 
holding that we might in some circumstances be wrong when we make judgements about 
our thoughts. To accept that we have some sort of epistemically privileged access, I take 
it, is merely to accept that there are occasions when we can uncontroversially attribute 
knowledge of our mental states to ourselves. 
Second: our access to our own thoughts or mental states usually is not inferential. 
Our knowledge of other people ' s mental states is inferred from their behaviour, but our 
knowledge of our own mental states is in some sense direct - not based upon 
examinations of what we have said or done. Again , if a psychologist explains to us that 
we have an unconscious belief or desire, we may indeed accept that she is correct, and 
come to hold that we do indeed possess such a belief or desire. But again, such cases are 
3 
not the norm - despite this, I do know that right now I believe the sun is shining, and I do 
not infer this from anything 1 have said or done, or anything someone else has said or 
done. My access to my thoughts, usually, is direct. It is a priori, in the sense that 
normally when we do have knowledge of our own mental states, thi s knowledge does not 
depend upon anything we could have inferred, or learned through sensory observation for 
its justification . 
A final point, which will feature importantly in Chapters 2 and 3, is that an 
adequate account of self-knowledge must also hold that we know the representational or 
semantic content of our thoughts. Not only do I know that I think that the sun is shining, 
but also I recognise this thought as representing something about the world - that is, I 
recognise it as being a thought about the sun. There may be many interesting features to 
our mental states - the relation they bear to our brains, for example, is one much 
discussed feature . Yet this is not what is at issue for self-knowledge. Rather, it is this 
representational content of our mental states that an account of self-knowledge is 
properly interested in . When we talk knowledgeably about our thoughts in the privileged 
and direct manner discussed above, we are talking about our thoughts as things with 
representational content. 
Like self-knowledge, externalism must be understood generally as there are 
different externalist theories of content. I will restrict my understanding of externalism to 
the general view that the Putnam ian Twin Earth thought experiments indicate that the 
actual content of our thoughts, our actual psychological states, are at least in some cases 
dependent upon our relations to our environment. Ifwe were related differently to the 
environment around us, then our thoughts in some cases would be different, even though 
our brains and bodies might be in precisely the same state. 
The Twin Earth thought experiments, pioneered in Putnam (1975), work as 
follows: imagine there is a Twin Earth exactly like ours in everyway, except that in the 
oceans, lakes, puddles and taps on Twin Earth , instead of having stuff chemically 
composed of H20, they have stuff that is phenomenologically indistinguishable from 
water, but which in fact has a chemical composition of XYZ. People on Twin Earth call 
this stuff "water" . Now imagine that Oscar, who lives on Earth, has a molecule for 
molecule duplicate on Twin Earth, Toscar. When Oscar, who knows nothing about the 
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chemical composition of water, thinks the thought "water is wet" this is a different 
thought from when Toscar thinks it - because the term "water" means something 
different on Earth and on Twin Earth . 
Originally, Putnam was making a claim about meaning - a claim belonging more 
in the realm of philosophy of language, rather than in philosophy of mind. Yet these 
thought experiments have been taken by many philosophers' to indicate that the actual 
content of our thoughts are externally individuated - what we are actually thinking is 
dependent in certain ways upon our environment. Not only does the word "water" mean 
something different when Oscar utters it, from what it means when Toscar utters it, when 
Oscar thinks "water is wet" he is thinking something different from what Toscar is 
thinking, when he thinks "water is wet". Oscar's claim, say, that "there is water in that 
glass" has different truth conditions from Toscar's claim "there is water in that glass". 
Oscar's claim will be true iff there is H20 in the glass, while Toscar's claim will be true 
iff there is XYZ in the glass. This will be the case even if both of them believe their term 
"water" to apply to any clear, tasteless, non-toxic liquid. Thus the content of their 
thoughts is different, and this is difference can be attributed to a difference in their 
environment. 
I will present the incompatibilist challenge as applying to any theory of mental 
content that draws upon the intuitions brought out by these thought experiments - on my 
rendition, the incompatibilist is denying that we can know in a privileged way what the 
contents of our thoughts are, if the contents of our thoughts are externalistically 
individuated in the manner described above. The question, then, is whether the relation 
between world and thought contents, as it is understood in these thought experiments, 
allows that epistemically privileged access to the contents of certain kinds of our own 
thoughts is possible. 
There is some prima facie reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge are 
incompatible. The difficulty stems from the consideration that externalism entails that 
thoughts need to be individuated differently if certain extrinsic, environmental factors 
were to become different. Oscar and Toscar, remember, may both believe that when they 
are thinking about the stuff they both call "water" they are thinking about any clear, 
1 For a prominent and influential example, see Burge (1979). 
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tasteless, non-toxic liquid. Yet this is not the case. If Oscar were to somehow travel to 
Twin Earth, and strike up a conversation with a Toscar, Oscar might well believe that he 
and Toscar were talking about the same stuff when they were talking about "water". Yet 
Oscar would be wrong about this. They are taking about different stuff. Oscar's claim 
"there is water in that glass" will be false if the liquid in that glass is chemically 
composed of anything other than H20. Likewise, Toscar's corresponding claim "there is 
water in that glass" is false if the liquid in that glass is composed of anything other than 
XYZ. Oscar and Toscar are having different thoughts - Oscar is thinking and talking 
about water (the stuffchemically composed of H20) while Toscar is thinking and talking 
about !Water (the stuff chemically composed of XYZ). Whether Oscar is thinking a 
thought involving the concept "water" or "twater" is partly dependent upon what is in the 
world around him. If environmental conditions were to have been different, so too would 
have been the concept water that Oscar possesses. Whether Oscar possesses the concept 
"water" or "twater" thus seems to be knowable only in virtue of first knowing certain 
facts about his environment. This, then, is aprimajacie worry regarding the 
compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge - what must be explained, therefore, is 
how Oscar can know he is thinking that there is water in that glass - without first 
discovering whether he is actually thinking of water or twater. In the next section, I will 
examine the two major ways in which incompatibilists have articulated worries of this 
kind. 
(II) Incompatibilism 
One way of articulating the incompatibilist worry is to raise what I will call the 
Achievement Problem - this maintains that, given the implications of externalism, the 
sufficient conditions for self-knowledge cannot be achieved. The following thought 
experiment is used to support this intuition: imagine that, unbeknown to him, Oscar is 
slowly switched between Earth and Twin Earth, so that he spends enough time in each 
place to acquire both concepts, water and twater. Now, it seems that when he says "water 
is wet", meaning to express a belief he has about the world, the beliefhe will express at a 
certain time will be one belief he has (water is wet) and at another time will be another 
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belief he has (twater is wet). However, since he is unaware of the fact that he is switching 
between Earth and Twin Earth, he will not know this. In this case, the argument goes, 
Oscar could not be properly said to know whether he occurrently believes that water is 
wet, or twater is wet. This challenge was put forward first in Boghossian (1988). 
In formalising this concern as an argument against compatibilism, I will follow 
Anthony Brueckner2. On this formulation, the Achievement Problem poses a sceptical 
challenge to our knowledge of our thoughts, which may be presented as follows: 
A I) If I know that I believe that water is wet, then I must know that I do not 
believe that twater is wet. 
A2) I do not know that I do not believe that twater is wet. 
A3) Therefore, I do not know that J believe that water is wet. 
In the above argument, the slow switch possibility is used to underwrite the argument's 
second premise - if Oscar was being slowly switched, then whenever he had a thought 
"water is wet" at some points he would be thinking that H20 is wet, while at other points 
in his life, he would be thinking that XYZ was wet. 
Note that the above sceptical argument against self-knowledge closely resembles 
the Cartesian sceptical argument against our knowledge of the external world. While 
there are a variety of ways of understanding how a sceptical argument is supposed to 
work, one understanding of a standard Cartesian sceptical argument may present it as 
follows: 
SI) If! know that I have hands, then I must know that I am not a brain in a vat 
S2) I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat 
S3) Therefore, I do not know that J have hands. 
Like the Achievement Problem, th is sceptical argument uses a thought experiment to 
underwrite the second premise - the sceptic invites us to imagine a world where we are 
indeed brains in a vat, having our sense organs simulated by electro-chemicals to produce 
2 Sec Brueckner (1990). 
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the sensations that we rely upon when we judge that, say, the sun is shining. Unless we 
can rule out the possibility that this is in fact the case, the sceptic claims, we cannot know 
that we have hands. Likewise, it seems, the incompatibilist is suggesting that unless we 
can rule out the possibility of a slow switch, we cannot know that we believe that water is 
wet - because we may in fact believe that twater is wet. The incompatibilist, in 
presenting this sceptical challenge, it seems, is endorsing standards for knowledge, which 
- if we generalised them - would render knowledge of the external world impossible. In 
order to be able to properly know that I am thinking that water is wet, the incompatibilist 
claims, I must be able to know that I am not thinking that twater is wet. 
I will not be dealing exp licitly or implicitly with the problem of scepticism here. I 
mention scepticism in this context only because it seems that given the sort of challenge 
being posed here, the problems the compatibilist faces may be analogous to the problem 
faced by anyone attempting to refute Cartesian scepticism. In this sense, the references I 
make to scepticism may be suggestive, but the strength of this analogy is not something I 
will explore. My comments On scepticism are used only to illustrate what I see as useful 
points for the debate surrounding externalism and self-knowledge, and should be treated 
as parenthetical. 
At first glance it may seem that the sceptic sets an implausibly high standard for 
knowledge - given that if generalised, these standards imply that we do not know a great 
many things that we previously assumed we did know. What exactly the sceptic's criteria 
for knowledge are, is debatable; yet One understanding - which Barry Stroud thinks 
originates from Descartes - claims these standards are based on our everyday ascriptions 
ofknowledge3 To borrow Stroud's example, imagine I see a yellow bird out my window. 
I have a limited experience of birds, but I come to believe that the bird outside my 
window is a canary. Now imagine that I can ' t tell the difference between canaries and 
goldfinches (in fact quite true). If the bird outside my window had been a goldfinch, and 
not a canary, I still would have formed the belief that there is a canary outside my 
window. Do I know that there is a canary outside my window? It is obvious that I don't 
know this. To suggest that this is something I might know seems incorrect - I am 
) See Stroud ( I 984A). 
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certainly not a reliable canary-detector of any kind, and there is no reason to suggest that 
my belief that there is a canary outside my window is anything other than mere belief. 
How are we to explain why I don ' t know that there is a canary outside my 
window in this case? Stroud explains: 
Reflecting ... on the uncontroversial everyday examples alone can easily lead us 
to suppose that it is something like this: if somebody knows that something,p, he 
must know the falsity of all those things incompatible with his knowing that p (or 
perhaps all those things he knows to be incompatible with his knowing thatp)4 
Given that this is based on the way in which we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and 
others in everyday life, there is great intuitive support for this account. And if this is 
correct, then we can use the following argument to explain why I do not know that there 
is a canary outside my window: 
Cal) If I know that the bird outside my window is a canary, then [ must know 
that it is not a goldfinch. 
Ca2) I do not know that it is not a goldfinch. 
Ca3) Therefore, I do not know there is a canary outside my window. 
Premise Cal is supported by Stroud 's principle . If the bird was a goldfinch, then I could 
not be properly said to know that it is a canary. Thus I must know it is not a goldfinch, if 
I am to know the falsity of all the things incompatible with my knowing it is a canary. 
Premise Ca2 is supported by the fact that I can't tell canaries from goldfinches - that if it 
really was a goldfinch, I would still bel ieve that it was a canary. This appears to be a 
good explanation of why I do not know that there is a canary outside my window. 
The problem is that we can generalise cases like this so that they apply to all our 
knowledge claims regarding the external world. Since this argument works in the same 
way as the above sceptical argument, it seems that if it is correct, then so is scepticism. I 
understand this to be why scepticism is such a disturbing problem. To defeat scepticism 
, Stroud (1984A pp. 29 -30). 
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would entail showing either that these standards are wrong, or that they are not universal. 
That is, we can deny that this is why I do not kn ow that there is a canary outside my 
window, or we can claim that Stroud 's explanation is correct but only in that particular 
kind of case. I am not always required to meet these requirements in order to genuinely 
possess knowledge. But th is second option means that to say that th e incompatibili st is 
endorsing these requirements for self-knowledge is not to commit her to a general 
scepticism. The incompatibil ist need not think these standards are universal - all she is 
committed to is the claim that these requirements must be met if we are to possess self 
knowledge. 
Nonetheless, there is reason to suppose these requirements may be considered too 
strict - since, if generalised, they lead to scepticism. Thus at this point we might already 
suspect that a key difference between incompatibilist and compatibilist on this matter 
might be that compatibili st supports lower requirements for self-knowledge than does 
incompatibilist. I wi ll return to thi s thought briefly in Section IV, and again in Chapter 2. 
After the Achievement Problem, the second problem incompatibilists use to 
generate a worry for compatibilism I call the Consequence Problem5 In this argument, 
the incompatibilist attempts to demonstrate that such a compatibilism would have absurd 
consequences. It offers the fo llowing argument: 
C I) If I am thinking that water is wet, then I must be in an environment that 
contains or did contain water 
C2) I am thinking that water is wet. 
C3) Therefore, I am in an environment that contains or did contain water. 6 
If compatibilism is true, then it seems that C I and C2 are both knowable, if at all , a 
priori. Self-knowledge implies that I need not justify my judgements about my own 
thoughts by any a posteriori examination. I know I believe that the sun is shining, 
5 To my knowledge, the first person to describe it as such was Martin Davies in Davies (2000) . 
6 In formulating the problem as simply as this, I am setting as ide the considerations, originally used against 
Michael McKinsey who pioneered this challenge, that an externalist is not necessarily comm itted to C2. 
However, Jessica Brown's sophisticated rendering of the cha llenge, I think, can successfully and fairly 
obviously overcome that particular problem, so r will leave the matter as ide for the sake of simplicity. See 
Brown (1995). 
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without having to investigate my environment. Externalism, also, is a thesis that could be 
known simply by armchair reflection - one need not necessarily have read Burge in order 
to arrive at those conclusions about mental content, one could conceivably arrive at them 
by a priori reflection. But then it follows that we could reason from C I and C2, and thus 
come to have a priori knowledge of our environment. That is absurd - we can surely only 
have a posteriori knowledge of those kinds of specific facts about the external world. 
Note that the above argument also relies on a principle philosophers have 
associated with scepticism - the idea that knowledge be closed under known entailment; 
that is, if! know thatp, and I know thatp entails that q, then I must be in a position to 
know that q. Philosophers like Fred Dretske have argued that denying such a principle 
applies to our knowledge of the external world is in fact the only way to refute 
scepticism 7 - which suggests, for Dretske, given that scepticism is such an unacceptable 
position, that knowledge being closed under known entailment simply must be false in 
those sorts of cases. Again, this might perhaps be taken to suggest that the requirements 
for knowledge endorsed by the incompatibilist are higher than those supported by the 
compatibilist - the incompatibilist, it might be said, sees a failure of closure implying a 
failure of knowledge, whereas the compatibilist disagrees. I will return to this thought 
later. 
There are other background assumptions at work in the Consequence Problem, 
which must be made clearer. Note that in order for this strategy to work, it must assume 
that to know that we are thinking water is wet, means that we must know that we are 
thinking the proposition water is wet, and that we are not thinking the proposition !water 
is wet. If Oscar is to know he is thinking water is wet, it is assumed that he must know 
the thought he is thinking is a water-thought and not a !water-thought, or any other 
thought. If it turned out that he did not need to know whether the thought he is thinking is 
a water- or !water-thought in order to know that he what thought he is thinking, then the 
Consequence Problem would not get far off the ground. For ifhe did not need to know 
whether he was thinking a water-thought or a twater-thought, or any other thought hact in 
any other imagined environmental conditions, then what he would be able to infer about 
his environment, would be that his environment is one of an infinite number of different 
7 Dretskc (1 999). 
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environments, consistent with the term "water" expressing a natural kind concept, or 
merely with Oscar thinking it expresses a natural kind concept. It would be consistent 
with Oscar being on any number of Twin Earths, or a Dry Earth, where there is in fact no 
water, but where the community of language-speakers collectively hallucinate that there 
is8, or any other possibilities of this kind . If this were to be all that Oscar is capable of 
inferring, then the conclusion here would be too vague to have any fo rce. And if, as this 
would suggest, the conclusion is merely that he must be in an environment upon which 
having his thought "water is wet" depends, then the conclusion becomes trivial. Of 
course I can know by reflection that I am in the environment that I am, in fact, in . The 
incompatibili st, however, wishes the conclusion to be more specific than that. In this 
way, in offering this challenge, the compatibilist imagines that in order to genuinely 
know I am thinking water is wet, I must be able to know enough aboul that thought, to be 
able to infer something particular about the world in this way. What precisely the 
incompatibili st thinks I am required to know about water is not entirely clear, yet it seems 
it must be specific enough to infer specific facts about my environment. What the 
incompatibilist has in mind here, or how plausible this requirement is, is at this stage not 
clear, but I will leave the issue for now. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will rev isit the question of 
what we need to know about our concepts in order to possess them, or in order to know 
we possess them. 
In general , however, I think we can extract the fo llowing assumptions from the 
incompatibilist position: from the Achievement Problem, that the sceptic' s requirements 
for knowledge apply to self-knowledge, and from the Consequence Prob lem, that the 
relevant sort of knowledge is (philosophical reflection and self-knowledge) closed under 
known entailment, and that to know that I am thinking that "water is wet" requires me to 
know enough about the concept "water" to be able to infer something specific about the 
environment. 
8 For a discussion of the Dry Earth possibility, see Boghossian (1998) and MCLaughlin and Tye (1998). 
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(III) Incompatibilism and Explanation 
In this section, I wish to consider the sort of question being asked by the incompatibilist 
in raising these two problems. It is important to note the ends to which the incompatibilist 
intends to use the Achievement and Consequence Problems, if we are to understand the 
kind of question she is asking, and subsequently the sort of answer that needs to be 
delivered. My discussion will also touch on the relevance of the debate. 
First note that if it turns out that externalism and self-knowledge are indeed 
incompatible, the consequences would be significant. Brian McLaughlin and Michael 
Tye, for example, say that: 
we find [privileged self-knowledge) sufficiently compelling that if Twin Earth 
externalism is incompatible with this privileged access thesis, that is a powerfully 
compelling reason for rejecting Twin Earth externalism. Indeed, were we 
ourselves to come to think that the incompatibilist view is right, we would reject 
Twin Earth externalism9 
That we have self-knowledge of this sort is not a universally held view. Certainly, there 
are deflationary accounts available, denying that our knowledge of our own mental states 
is genuinely special. 10 Yet self-knowledge is certainly intuitively compelling - in 
everyday life, we operate under the assumption that we tend to know what we are 
thinking; our everyday ascriptions of thoughts to ourselves presuppose not only that we 
can know what we are thinking, but also that we can know it without having to provide 
any kind of evidence. If it turned out that we do in fact not have self-knowledge of this 
kind, this would constitute a profoundly deep sceptical challenge. Both Cartesian and 
Humean scepticism seeks to undercut our knowledge of the external world , yet these 
projects, if successful, would not cut as deeply as the sceptical challenge that would 
follow from the falsity of self-knowledge. Indeed, the Cartesian doubt relies upon us 
being able to know that we are thinking certain things - what it disputes is that we can 
9 McLaughlin & Tye (1998, p. 289). 
10 See, for example, Wright (1998). 
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know that the world around us corresponds to how we think it is. Without self-
knowledge, however, it is not obvious how that question would even be possible. Without 
knowing what we are thinking of, it is difficult to imagine how we could begin to 
compare our thoughts to the world at all. Many philosophers reject Cartesian or Humean 
scepticism on the grounds that it simply must be wrong - its conclusion is one that we as 
agents are unable to take seriously !!. The idea that we know about the external world , or 
at least are justified in believing certain things about it, seems largely unshakeab le. No 
matter how strong the sceptic's argument, we do not suspend our belief, for example, that 
the sun will rise tomorrow, or that it is shining now. The claim that we lack self-
knowledge would be as difficult - if not more so - to take seriously in thi s sense. Just as 
the sceptical argument does not make me suspend my belief that the sun is shin ing, 
likewise, a sceptical argument against self-knowledge would not make me suspend my 
belief about what I am thinking; we make judgements about our thoughts all the time, and 
with unshakeable confidence. An argument claiming that I may well be wrong whenever 
I attribute thoughts or beliefs to myself would not have any affect on my beliefs about my 
thoughts. In this sense then, the claim that we lack self-knowledge is not easy to take 
seriously. 
The fact that self-knowledge occupies such a central and undeniable role in our 
conception of ourselves, would, as McLaughlin and Tye suggest, spell trouble for 
externalism, if externalism and self-knowledge are indeed incompatible. Consider the 
following remark Paul Boghossian makes: 
philosophers who embrace externali sm don't do so because they regard it as a 
self-evident truth. They embrace it, rather, because their intuitive responses to a 
certain kind of thought experiment .. . appear to leave them little choice.!2 
If a consequence of externalism were that it rendered self-knowledge impossible, then 
externalists would find that they have conflicting intuitive responses, and , as such, a little 
more choice about whether to accept externalism or not. On intuition alone, certainly, it 
II For a discussion of this , see Jones (2000). 
12 B.oghossian (1998, p. 273). 
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appears easier to reject externalism than it does to reject that we possess self-knowledge. 
Disregarding the intuitive support for externalism, clearly, would be a lot easier if it did 
turn out to be incompatible with self-knowledge. 
Yet abandoning externalism would be no small measure. As Burge has observed, 
in his view, externalism: "has carried the day among the vast majority of philosophers 
who have understood and reflected upon it"13 A great deal of work in philosophy of 
mind is accommodating to the externalist intuition - to name a few, Burge, Donald 
Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ruth Millikan, David Papineau, John McDowell and even Jerry 
Fodor, amongst many others, put forward theories of content that are in some sense 
externalist-friendlyl4 Externalism enjoys widespread support - abandoning externalism 
would fly in the face of a great deal of influential work in philosophy of mind, and should 
not be done lightly. 
Now the fact that the conclusion that self-knowledge and externalism are 
incompatible would be so difficult to accept, may motivate some philosophers to dismiss 
or play down the importance of these challenges - given their conclusion, they might 
reason, these arguments must be wrong at some point. In reply to thi s manner of response 
to external world scepticism, philosophers like Stroud have stressed that we should not 
understand a philosopher endorsing the sceptical argument as attempting to demonstrate 
that we in fact lack knowledge of the external world. Rather, Stroud thinks, we should 
understand the sceptic to be someone already convinced that we do in fact possess 
knowledge of the external world, but who is uncertain as to how we can explain this, 
given the plausibility of scepticism. IS The sceptic does not need to be shown that we have 
knowledge, for Stroud; what must be shown is how we have it. 
In a similar way, the plausibility of both externalism and self-knowledge should 
not motivate us to dismiss incompatibilism out of hand. Rather, we can understand 
incompatibilists not as attempting to show that we do lack self-knowledge, but, in the 
same way as Stroud understands the sceptic, to be asking a question about how we have 
self-knowledge, assuming externalism to be true. In support of this, Boghossian says: 
13 Burge (2003B, p. 397). 
14 For example, see Burge (1979), Davidson (1983), Dretske (1989), Fodor (1995), McDowell (1986) 
Millikan (1989), Papineau (! 984). 
" Stroud (1989). 
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I consider the sceptical claim about self-knowledge to have the status of a 
paradox: apparently acceptable premises lead to an unacceptable conclusion. For J 
do not seriously envisage that we do not know our own minds. 16 
The argument does not intend to press the claim that we lack self-knowledge - that we 
have self-knowledge is something that an incompatibilist like Boghossian accepts 
already. His argument is thus not to be taken as an argument against self-knowledge, but 
rather as presenting a challenge to the compatibilist to explain how we have it. This 
construal seems to agree with Stroud, and closely parallels the way in which Crispin 
Wright understands the standard sceptical challenge; Wright says that the problem with 
scepticism (about the external world) is that it leads us to an absurd conclusion (like I 
cannot know I have hands) by means of a "seemingly well-motivated route" . According 
to Wright, an adequate answer to scepticism cannot merely offer reasons to suppose that 
knowledge in the domain in question is possible. For whether or not that knowledge is 
possible is not, or not all, the sceptic is asking, according to Wright. What is further 
required, he says, is that a satisfactory answer to a sceptical challenge must inform us of 
where we have gone wrong in our reasoning. A so lution to a sceptical challenge must 
offer "a properly detailed diagnosis and expose of its power to seduce"17. 
The question being asked, then , is: how do we have knowledge of the content of 
our own occurrent thoughts, if externalism is correct, given the sceptical challenge raised 
by the Achievement Problem, and the reductio argument raised by the Consequence 
Problem? In this way, in responding to these problems, the compatibilist may not merely 
insist that self-knowledge must be possible - for it is not that question that is, or is only, 
at issue. If the challenges being posed are not expected to undermine self-knowledge, the 
question becomes one of explaining how exactly self-knowledge is possible, given the 
considerations that the incompatibilist offers. 
What is required in an explanation of how self-knowledge is possible? Plausibly 
understood, to explain something, p, is to answer the question: "why p rather than q "? As 
16 Boghossian (1988, p. 150). 
17 Both from Wright (1991, p. 89). 
16 
Bas van Fraassen says, one needs a "rather" clause in an explanation to distinguish what 
is it about a proposition one wants explained: if we asking for an explanation of why 
Peter ate the apple, it is ambiguous what exactly we are looking for. Do we want to know 
why Peter, rather than Paul , ate the apple, or why Peter ate the apple rather than the 
orange? For clarification, then, one must add the "rather" clause18 This seems 
uncontroversial. 
Now in asking for an explanation of self-knowledge and externalism, I take it that 
we must add in a further " if' clause. Thus the question being asked is: "why are our 
judgements about our own thou ghts knowledge, rather than mere belief, if externalism is 
true?" Ifwe can understand why we should take such judgements to count as knowledge 
rather than mere belief, then this, it seems, will explain how it is we possess self-
knowledge if externalism is true. Thus the explanation can be provided by supplying 
reasons to suppose these judgements count as knowledge rather than mere belief, if 
externalism is true. 
These reasons must also be stronger than the reasons to think our judgements to 
be mere belief rather than knowledge. If we have no better reason to think of our 
judgements as knowledge, than we do to think of them as mere belief, then I take it that 
we do not have a good reason to think of these judgements as knowledge. This might be 
seen as somewhat one-sided; since the incompatibilist needs only to draw, whilst the 
compatibilist must win. All the same, without the compatibilist's reasons being stronger, 
I cannot see how we can take ourselves to have good reason to consider our judgements 
about our thoughts to be knowledge, rather than mere belief. If this is not obtained, it is 
difficult to see how an adequate explanation to have been given. 
Note that if this is the case, and this is indeed what the compatibilist needs to 
provide, the incompatibilist is not necessarily committed to Stroud 's standards for 
knowledge, articulated earlier with regard to the Achievement Problem. The 
incompatibilist need not accept outright that these standards are correct. All the 
incompatibilist is asking is that given the plausibility of those standards, why are our 
judgements about our thoughts knowledge rather than belief, if externalism is true? Those 
standards provide some reason to think that our judgements, if externalism is true, are 
" For example, see van Fraassen, (1977). 
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mere belief. What is required in response is some reason to think that our judgements 
count as knowledge, if externalism is true. I will return to these matters in Chapter 3; in 
responding to Burge's solution to the Achievement and Consequence Problems, J will 
argue that Burge does not provide this sort of explanation of how self-knowledge is 
possible, and that his solution is for thi s reason inadequate. 
In the next section, I will offer a cursory examination of the compatibilist 
responses to these challenges. I will not examine the plausibility of these responses here -
that task I will leave until Chapter 2 - instead, I will merely provide an overview of the 
landscape; I mean only to sketch the available options, and their prima facie implications. 
I have chosen these particular responses because the positions they argue for seem to me 
to encompass all available positions one can take in response to the Achievement or 
Consequence Problems. There may indeed be other available arguments for these 
positions, but I can see no other available positions. As such, when I respond to these 
arguments in Chapter 2, I will focus my criticisms on the positions they adopt, rather than 
on their arguments for these positions. In this way, I hope to make my criticisms of 
compatibilism as general as possible. 
(III) Compatibilism 
There are two ways of responding to the Achievement Problem, and three ways of 
responding to the Consequence Problem. The first way of responding to the Achievement 
Problem is to accept that Oscar, if he were indeed to undergo a slow switch, would not 
know that he is thinking that water is wet. However, the response maintains, the 
possibility of a slow switch is too implausible to undermine self-knowledge - given that 
we are in fact not undergoing a slow switch, we still can be said to know that we are 
thinking that "water is wet". Ted A. Warfield explains that indeed for Oscar, if he is 
being slowly switched between Earth and Twin Earth, then the possibility of error 
introduced in the Achievement Problem is a relevant alternative - and that the argument 
does establish that Oscar, in this case, does lack self-knowledge. What it does not 
establish, he argues, is that we, who are not undergoing a slow-switch, lack-self-
knowledge in this way. What this argument establishes, for Warfield, is that it is not 
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necessary that any agent be able to know their thoughts non-inferentially - but that is not 
the same as the point that we do not know our thoughts non-inferentiall/ 9 
This argument, then, denies that Stroud's condition must be met in order to be 
properly said to know something. We can, on this response, know that we are thinking 
that water is wet, even though we cannot rule out the possibil ity of a state of affairs 
obtaining (a slow switch) which would undermine our knowledge here. Ifwe accept 
Warfield's point here, then we deny that Stroud's condition for knowledge is correct. 
Burge has another response to the Achievement Problem. He points out that the 
second-order thought: "I am thinking that water is wet" is immune from error. That is, 
whenever you make a claim about what you believe in that sort of way, it is entirely 
impossible for that claim to ever be false. In this way Burge concludes that the negative 
force raised by the possibility of a slow-switch is dissipated. Thus the Achievement 
Problem does not generate a genuine threat to self-knowledge. 
His argument runs as follows: cogito-l ike Qudgements about what I am currently 
thinking) are never wrong, because thinking the second-order thought ("I am thinking 
that water is wet") is possible to do only whilst thinking the corresponding first-order 
thought ("water is wet") so that the concept ("water") expressed in the first-order is 
conceptually redeployed to the second-order. In this way, whatever the term "water" 
means in the first-order thought, it will mean the same thing in the second-order thought 
as well. So whilst we might not be able to tell whether we are expressing one particular 
concept by our term "water" or another distinct concept, we can still be said to know that 
we are thinking that water is wet. So, the possibility of a switch does not impact on our 
ability to know what we are thinking20 
So, on Burge's account, even though we cannot tell whether we are having water-
thoughts or twater-thoughts, we can still be said to know what we are thinking, when we 
say: "water is wet". I will leave any further discussion of this response until the next 
chapter. My general conclusions from this preliminary sketch of the Compatibilist 
options will exclude Burge's response; but I will discuss his argument at length in the 
following two chapters. 
19 Warfield (1992, pp. 215 - 221). 
20 Burge (1988, pp. 111 - 128). 
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The Consequence Problem, recall offers the following argument as a reductio of 
compatibilism: 
C I) I fl am thinking that water is wet, then I must be in an environment that 
contains or did contain water. 
C2) I am thinking that water is wet. 
C3) Therefore, I am in an environment that contains or did contain water. 
Now one available response to this problem is to deny that C 1 is knowable without 
empirical observation. McLaughlin and Tye respond in this manner - they claim that 
knowing I am thinking that "water is wet" is not sufficient to know that there is water in 
my environment. For all I know, they claim, I could be on Twin Earth, or Dry Earth, or 
anyone of an infinite number of possible worlds. As a result, they argue, I cannot know, 
on the basis of my thought that "water is wet" that actual H20 exists in my environment. 
They argue that Oscar may still know in a privileged way, that he is thinking that "water 
is wet" even though he may not know whether his concept is the concept "water" 
"twater" or any other Twin concept. This response, then, denies the incompatibilist view 
that in order to properly know that I am thinking "water is wet" I need know enough 
about a concept in order to be in a position from which I could use externalism to infer 
specific facts about the environment. McLaughlin and Tye thus do disagree with the 
incompatibilist that I am required to know enough about the application conditions of my 
concepts to be able to infer specific things about the environment, in order to genuinely 
possess that concept, or know I possess it2l . 
Another available response is to deny that premise C2, that I am thinking that 
water is wet, is knowable by anyone who is not already in a position to know C3, the 
conclusion. In this way, this strategy denies that the Consequence Problem offers us a 
means of acquiring new knowledge of the world, and thus denies that it can be 
successfully used as a reductio. This is Bill Brewer's strateg/2• However, if faced with 
the Achievement Problem, this strategy would have to adopt a response similar to that of 
21 McLaughlin and Tye (1998, pp. 285 - 319). 
22 Brewer (2000, pp . 415 - 433). 
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Warfield, which was mentioned above. If I am being slowly-switched between Earth and 
Twin Earth , I will not, I take it, be in a position to know that there is water in my 
environment. My environment will genuinely be changing every so often, so whatever 
empirical observations I have made in the past will not establish that there is H20 around 
me now. However, Brewer maintains that if! am not in a position to know that there is 
water in my environment, then I cannot genuinely know that water is wet. Therefore, 
Oscar, if slowly switched, would not genu inely know that he is thinking that water is wet. 
In this way, Brewer, like Warfield, must deny Stroud ' s requirements for knowledge -
which again indicates that the requirements for knowledge assumed here are less 
stringent than those assumed by the incompatibilist. 
A third strategy is to accept both premise C I and C2, but deny that having warrant 
to believe those premises gives us warrant to believe the conclusion. This is Martin 
Davies' strateg/J . Davies argues for a limitation principle for the transfer ofepistemic 
warrant, so that, in arguments like the reductio argument used in the consequence 
problem, having warrant to believe each of the premises does not give us any reason to 
believe the conclusion. In this way, according to Davies, whilst I may know that I am 
thinking that water is wet, and I may know that if I am thinking that water is wet, then I 
am in an environment that contains or did contain water, but I may not use these known 
premises to deduce that I must be in an environment that contains or did contain water. If 
I am to genuinely know that, or be warranted in believing that, the warrant for that belief 
must come from somewhere else. In this way, Davies rejects the conclusion of the 
reductio argument - one cannot, ifhis limitation principle is correct, come to gain 
knowledge of the external world in the manner the Consequence Problem describes. It 
appears that Davies might be committed to the denial of deductive closure - seen 
superficially, hi s position seems consistent with the idea that someone could genuinely 
know that p, and genuinely know that p entails that q, but yet not know that q. If that is 
the case, then once more it seems that the requirements for knowledge adopted by the 
compatibilist are less stringent than the requirements adopted by the incompatibilist. 
In this way, with the exception of Burge's response, a superficial examination of 
the various compatibilist avenues available all appear to presuppose lower requirements 
2J Davies (2000, pp. 384 - 414). 
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for self-knowledge than those presupposed by the incompatibilist. Incompatibilists, I 
argued, presuppose or in some way endorse the following closely-related requirements 
for knowledge: first, that I need to be able to rule out the possibility that any state of 
affairs obtains, under which I would fail to have self-knowledge, in order to genuinely 
have knowledge. Second, that if! genuinely know that p, and genuinely know that p 
entails that q, then I must in a position to genuinely know that q. Third, that in order to 
genuinely know I am thinking that water is wet, my understanding of what the stuff 
"water" I refer to, must be detailed enough in order to allow me to infer certain specific 
things about the world. Setting Burge aside, compatibilists, it seems, deny one or more of 
the above requirements. 
Warfield and Brewer, it seems, must deny that in order to know I am thinking 
water is wet, I must be able to rule out the possibility of something like a slow-switch, the 
presence of which - they th ink - would undermine my knowledge that I am thinking that 
water is wet. 
McLaughlin and Tye deny that I need to know specific detail s about the concept 
"water" in order to genuinely know that I am thinking "water is wet" . According to 
McLaughlin and Tye, we have seen, this is precisely the area where the incompatibilist 
goes wrong. 
Davies, we have seen, appears to deny closure. If this is the case, then Davies 
denies that knowing that p, and that if p then q, entai ls that I be in a position to know that 
q. So, to revert to a standard sceptical example, to know that I have hands, does not 
requ ire me to also know that I am not a brain in a vat. 
In this way, a cursory examination of the compatibilist options appears to indicate 
that for the most part compatibilists are committed to lower requirements for knowledge 
than are incompatibilists. In the next chapter, I offer a more substantive examination of 
these strategies, focussing both on whether or not this is indeed an accurate assessment of 
their views, and upon whether their responses to the incompatibilist challenges are 
adequate. 
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Chapter 2 
In this chapter I will proceed as follows: In Sections 1- IV I will discuss the responses to 
the two incompatibilist challenges that I deem to be implausible responses. 
Unfortunately, due to space constraints, I will not be able to give these solutions the 
attention they deserve - my responses to them will be regrettably quick. Nonetheless, I 
think I will be able to convey the problems with these positions. I will begin by 
di scussing the three responses to the Consequence Problem, and then discuss the two 
responses to the Achievement Problem. 
In Section I, I will argue that the response of McLaughlin and Tye appears to 
commit itself to a two-factor theory of mental content, or a two-factor theory of thought 
types - the difference between the two apparently being merely "verbal". There are two 
problems with this: first, whether or not self-knowledge is compatible with a two-factor 
theory of content is distinct from the question of whether self-knowledge is compatible 
with externalism, so this does not address the incompatibilist concern. Second, there are 
independent reasons to think that two-factor theories, insofar as they maintain a 
commitment to externalism, cannot do the work McLaughlin and Tye require of them. 
In Section II, I will argue that Brewer's account is committed to a Warfield-like 
solution to the Achievement Problem. 
In Section III, I will argue that Davies is forced either to agree with Warfield and 
Brewer on this matter, or is forced to deny that knowledge of this sort is closed under 
known entailment, and that this second option is not a plausible one. 
In Section IV I will argue that Warfield is committed to an implausible account of 
self-knowledge. 
In Section V, I will discuss Burge's so lution; which appears much stronger. 
Burge, I will argue, offers the most plausible response to incompatibilism. Of all these 
options, Burge 's strategy is the strongest and most promising. However, in Chapter 3, I 
will argue that Burge's explanation of how we can have knowledge of the content of our 
thoughts does not give us reason to think that externalism is compatible with self 
knowledge. 
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(I) McLaughlin & Tye and Two-Factor Theories 
I will begin by examining the compatibilist responses to the Consequence Problem, 
starting with the response of McLaughlin and Tye. McLaughlin and Tye's project is 
focussed on responding to the specific formulations of the Consequence Problem 
endorsed by Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown and Paul Boghossian24. I will not go into 
any detail regarding this exchange, rather I will move straight into their positive account. 
McLaughlin and Tye deny that C I is knowable from the armchair. They maintain 
that we cannot have privileged access to whether our thoughts are Singular propositions 
(propositions that are dependent on features of the world or community in the sort of way 
that "water" is). If a singular proposition enters into the content of our thoughts, then this 
aspect of our thought content is not knowable to us. The idea of self-knowledge: 
does not imply or presuppose that we have privileged access to the Singular 
contents of such kind-dependent thoughts. Indeed, there can be illusory kind-
dependent thoughts. The thought that phlogiston caused the fire would be an 
example: a thinker of the thought might be under the cognitive illusion that it is a 
kind-dependent thought. 25 
In this way then, on their view we do not have any sort of privileged access to the 
singular contents of our kind-dependent thoughts, like our water thoughts, and this is 
because, it seems, of the possibility of illusory kind-dependent thoughts. Because it is 
always possible that our thoughts do in fact not have singular contents, or have different 
singular contents, we cannot have privileged access to this sort of content. The possibility 
of alternative singular contents, or illusory singular contents, which we cannot rule out, 
undermines our ability to know our singular contents. But what, then, is it that we have 
privileged access to, ifnot the singular content of our thoughts? 
McLaughlin and Tye acknowledge that mental states can be individuated in any 
number of ways. We could, presumably, type mental states according to their actual 
24 Sec McKinsey, (1991), Brown (1995), Boghossian (1998), and McLaughlin and Tye (1998). 
" McLaughlin and Tye (1998, p. 292). Emphasis mine. 
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content, or according to their physical realisers, or according to the functional role they 
play in the thinker's cognitive processes. Yet when we are to talk knowledgably about 
our own thoughts, in the manner described in the previous chapter, what we can know 
about our thoughts will be limited. I could not know without empirical research, for 
example, that my thought that the sun is shining outside correlates with a particular brain-
state I am in (assuming that it does). When using our privileged self-knowledge, we are 
only warranted to speak of our thoughts under certain descriptions of those thoughts - not 
all descriptions. Our thoughts do possess properties about which we cannot speak of 
knowledgably without empirical research. So under what descriptions of our thoughts are 
we entitled to speak of them? According to McLaughlin and Tye, self-knowledge is 
concerned only with mental states individuated from one another: 
in as fine-grained a way as is necessary for the purposes of any rationalising 
explanation. Whether typing occurrent thoughts by their contents will suffice for 
typing them in a way fine-grained enough for such purposes will depend on what 
sorts of contents are in question26• 
They also hold that individuating thoughts in terms of their actual content, when 
something like a natural kind concept is evoked, does not type them in as fine-grained a 
way as is necessary for rational ising explanation. Thinking "water is wet" might not 
always be the same as thinking that "H20 is wet" - Oscar may believe that the first of 
these claims is true, but perhaps not the first. As McLaughlin and Tye say: 
the mental state type thinking that water is wet can playa different role in 
rationalizing explanation from the role played by the mental state type thinking 
that H20 is wet. They are distinct mental state types. One can be in a state of the 
first type without being in a state of the second type27. 
26 Ibid, p. 293. 
27 Ibid, p. 294. 
25 
The problem stems from the fact that one might not know that "water" and "H20" in fact 
refer to the same stuff. If one treats the terms "water" and "H20" differently, if one 
believes that they do refer to different stuff, then it seems that each of these terms will 
play different roles in a rational ising explanation of that person's behaviour - the fact that 
it was in fact H20 in Oscar' s glass, might be irrelevant in explaining why he decided to 
drink from the glass - if he was unaware that the stuff he calls "water" actually is made 
of H20. McLaughlin and Tye expressly claim that we have no privileged access to the 
singular content of our thoughts. They say there is: 
no implication that one can know a priori that one's thought that p has a singular 
content or that it has a content into which a singular proposition enters as a 
component. 
And further: 
Were an incompatibilist to insist that privileged access [to our thoughts] should be 
understood in such a way as to imply that we have privileged access to whether 
our occurrent thoughts have associated singular propositions, then the proper 
response would be to reject the absurdly strong privileged access thesi s. 28 
From the above quotes, it seems McLaughlin and Tye think that we have privileged 
access to our thoughts only when typed in such a manner that does not reflect the singular 
content of such thoughts. Since we cannot know whether our thoughts have singular 
content, on their view, if we are to type our thoughts in such a way that they can be 
knowable to us, then we must type them in terms of something other than their singular 
content. What the singular content of our thoughts is, they claim, is not knowable to us. 
To maintain that we can have privileged access to the singular contents of our thoughts is 
"absurdly strong". 
On reflection, we can agree that self-knowledge is concerned with our mental 
states individuated in the manner that will be important for rational ising explanation. As I 
28 Ibid, p. 295. 
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will argue in Sections III and IV, one of the reasons we want self-knowledge in the first 
place is because our abi lity to function rationally and to critically engage with our 
thoughts requires the ability to know our own thoughts. To offer a rationalising 
explanation is to offer an explanation in terms of reasons, beliefs and desires. Yet for a 
mental state to genuinely give me a reason to perform an action, in the manner a 
rational ising explanation would require, then I must recognise that mental state as 
something that gives me a reason, and this means I must recognise it as something 
possessing content. If I am not acting because that mental state gives me a reason to act 
then offering a rationalising explanation will not be an appropriate explanation of my 
behaviour. To behave rationally is to recognise reasons as reasons. What makes a mental 
state a reason for an action is its content - what it represents in the world. To offer a 
rational ising explanation is to presuppose the agent recognises reasons as reasons - and 
this requires some kind of awareness of content. To borrow an example from Terence 
Horgan, if I fetch a beer from my fridge, a rational ising explanation of this act will offer 
the fact that I desired a beer, and believed there to be one in the fridge , as an explanation. 
Now if I did not myself recognise my mental state as representing that there was a beer in 
my fridge , then offering a rational ising explanation will no longer seem appropriate. If! 
do not recognise that my having this mental state means that there is a beer in my fridge, 
then we would more accurately explain my action mechanistically, in terms of cause and 
effect, rather than offering a rational ising explanation. Horgan says thi s of our intuitions 
on this matter: 
Our common-sense belief about our own actions - a belief with enormous force 
and vivacity, by virtue of the phenomenology of our own agency . .. - is that the 
content of the operative belief and desire has an ... immediate kind of 
causal/explanatory relevance to the action ?9 
Generally speaking, then, for a rationalising explanation to be appropriate requires that I 
take my mental state to have semantic or representational content; I have a reason to go to 
29 Horgan, (1991, p. 88) Emphasis mine. 
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the kitchen only because I understand my mental state to represent that there is a beer in 
my fridge. 
But according to externalism, the content of some of my mental states will be 
singular. An externalist, recall, claims that certain thoughts are object- or kind-dependent; 
that is; that the content of certain kinds of thoughts are partly dependent upon certain 
feature ' s of the subject's environment. Hence, the externalist maintains that certain of our 
thoughts have singular contents. But this raises the question: how then can McLaughlin 
and Tye deny that we have privileged access to the singular contents of our thoughts? 
Since knowledge of the content of our thoughts seems crucial to the appropriateness of a 
rationalising explanation, this implies that we only have access to some other non-
singular content that such thoughts possess. How is that something an externalist can 
accept? Burge describes his externalism, which he labels anti-individualism rather than 
externalism, as follows: 
anti-individualism is .. . a thesis ... about intentional mental states. It is about the 
constitutive or individuating conditions of propositional attitudes, perceptual 
states, the having of concepts, the applications of demonstratives, and so on30 
Externalism for Burge thus applies to actual attitudes, to the very manner in which we 
take the world to be; if environmental conditions are different, for Burge, then so too may 
be a person 's attitude, the very way that person actually takes the world to be. The 
rationalising explanation ofa person's behaviour, his attitude towards the world, must for 
Burge be externalistically individuated - any sort of "individualism" about mental states 
he rejects. Thus, if Oscar decides to drink a glass of water, and Toscar decides to drink a 
glass oftwater, Burge holds that there is in fact a different rational ising explanation of 
Oscar' s drinking a glass of water, than there is from the rational ising explanation of 
Toscar's drinking a glass oftwater. These are separate actions for Burge, with separate 
JO Burge, (2003A, p. 350). 
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reasons behind them. Thus, to type thoughts in as fine-grained a way for rational ising 
explanation is to type them in terms of their genuine representational (singular) content]! 
Clearly then, McLaughlin and Tye must disagree. But then how can they maintain 
a commitment to externalism and self-knowledge whilst maintaining that we have no 
privileged access to the singular contents of our thoughts? An obvious way of responding 
to this worry, would be for McLaughlin and Tye to commit to a two-factor theory of 
thought content or of thought types. If a thought is a singular proposition, then that it is a 
singular proposition is not knowable a priori to a person thinking that thought. What is 
knowable, this response says, is some other content that the thought has, or its mode of 
presentation, what I take its content to be. This is not an implausible thing to commit 
McLaughlin and Tye to; for they say: 
It is fairly common for philosophers who maintain that thoughts have singular 
propositions as their contents to maintain two-factor theories of thought types. On 
this view, it is not true that no two thought types can have exactly the same 
content. What is true, on this view, is, rather, that no two thought types can have 
exactly the same content and same mode of presentation of that content. Some 
philosophers, however. ... embrace a two-factor theory of content, with singular 
propositions as sometimes one of the two factors and a mode of presentation as 
the other32 . 
In this way then, McLaughlin and Tye can comfortably offer a two-factor theory as an 
explanation of how we can explain the subject knowing something about her thought, 
when she cannot know its singular content. So, for McLaughlin and Tye, when typing 
thoughts in the way required for rational ising explanation, requires we type them in terms 
of their mode of presentation, rather than their singular content. 
To hold a two-factor theory of thought types, as the name suggests, is to hold that 
in distinguishing one thought type from another, there are two factors that must be taken 
31 For other philosophers who endorse the above kind of claim about content, see Brewer (2000), 
McDowell (1986) and McCulloch (1995). Brewer, as we will see in the next section , argues directly that 
the external-content determining factors must be reason giving. 
l2 [bid, p. 294. 
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into account; first, its singular content, and second, its mode of presentation, how the 
subject presents the thought to herself. If either of these are different, according to this 
view, the thought type will be different. To speak ofa two-factor theory of thought type 
is to embrace something very like the distinction between "wide" and "narrow" content. 
Like a two-factor theory of content, there are two content-determining aspects; its 
singular or wide content, and its mode of presentation, which can be understood in much 
the same way as narrow content.J3 
However, it is important to note that they do not expressly maintain that this is the 
only way to explain what we have privileged access to; it is merely "fairly common". My 
committing them to this position is thus undersupported . Yet if they are not committed to 
a two-factor view, they must explain how we can know our thoughts without knowing 
what the singular contents of our thoughts are. For this, as I' ve shown, is what they are 
explicitly committed to. It is not clear how they could precede in this - since they 
expressly maintain that we have no privileged access to singular content, and yet think 
that we can nonetheless know our thoughts typed in the way required for rationalising 
explanation. Typing them in that way, I argued, is to type them in terms of content34 
In thi s way, it seems either they require a two-factor theory of some kind , or they 
need some explanation of how typing thoughts in the way required for a rational ising 
explanation is not to type them in by means of some semantic or representational content, 
or even by the mode of presentation. Embracing a two-factor theory here seems the only 
feasible option. 
But to respond to the incompatibilist in this way does not answer the question. 
Incompatibilists are not addressing two-factor theorists. If one maintains that thoughts 
have "wide" and "narrow" contents, and that we have privileged access only to "narrow" 
contents, then the problems the incompatibilist raises will obviously not apply - since 
both of these focus on the "wide" nature of content to cause difficulties . The 
Achievement Problem argues that the possibility of unnoticed environmental changes 
33 McLaughlin and Tye do themselves not understand the distinction between two-factor theories of thought 
types and two-factor theories of content, understanding the distinction to be merely "verbal". See 
McLaughlin and rye (1998 p. 294). As such, I think my conflating mode of presentation with narrow 
content, as I do above, is legitimate in this context. 
34 Or at the very least to type them in the way we take the content to be; by its narrow content, or mode of 
presentation. I accept that these would suffice for rationalising explanation. 
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threaten our abi lity to know our thoughts. This clearly, can only apply to thought content 
that depends upon the environment. If we are talking about thought content that does not 
depend upon the environment in this way, this possibility would be no threat to 
knowledge. The Consequence Problem can only work if thought content implies 
particular environmental conditions. Once again, this can only apply to thought content 
that does indeed has these implications. The incompatibi li st wants to know how a theory 
of content that have these implications can be compatible with self-knowledge. To say we 
can know only the contents of our thoughts that do not have these implications, then , is to 
agree with the incompatibilist, rather than answering their question. To say we know our 
thoughts only when described in such a way as to leave out their wide or representational 
content does not answer the incompatibilist concern. That we can know our thoughts in 
that way, the incompatibilist would accept as obvious. However, then the question is how 
do we maintain compatibilism without evoking a two-factor theory. Since McLaughlin 
and Tye do not think we can have privileged access to the "wide" or singular content of 
our thoughts, their response is no use in answering this question. What is needed then, if 
this avenue of response to the Consequence Problem is to succeed, is an explanation of 
how the sort of privileged access we have to our mental states can be understood, given it 
does not entail we know whether or not our thoughts are singular propositions, without 
resorting to a two-factor theory. In Section V, I will argue that Burge provides a far more 
plausible answer to this question. On Burge's view, as I will show, we can indeed have 
privileged access to the singular contents of our thoughts. 
However, even allowing the resort to a two-factor theory in this way does not 
remove difficulties - this resort, as Michael McKinsey points out, is not enough to rescue 
McLaughlin and Tye from violating either externalism, or self-knowledge.35 McKinsey 
criticises McLaughlin and Tye 's recourse to a two-factor view by pointing out that a two-
factor view maintains that a thought's content is determined by both wide and narrow 
content. Both are important, on this view, in individuating a thought. Thus, McKinsey 
claims, if McLaughlin and Tye maintain we can know only the narrow content, and not 
know the wide, then it seems we do not know the actual content of the thought we are 
having; since both are essential to that thought having its content. According to two-
" McKinsey (2001). 
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factor theories, a thought's content has two essential properties; its wide content, and its 
narrow content, or mode of presentation. Not knowing one would be sufficient to 
undermine our knowledge of the overall content. McKinsey says: 
For on the two-factor view, a sentence like [I am thinking that water is wet] will 
ascribe a type T of thought that either involves both factors, or one of the two. If 
T involves both the singular proposition [that water is wet] and a mode of 
presentation of that proposition, or T involves just the singular proposition alone, 
then it follows that [I am thinking that water is wet] says or logically implies that 
[I have] a thought whose content is the singu lar proposition [that water is wet]. 
But of course, McLaughlin and Tye explicitly deny this consequence. 36 
McKinsey's point is that even on a two-factor view there is no escaping the fact that 
singular propositions enter into the content of a thought - the content of our thoughts, on 
this view is made up of both singular content and mode of presentation, or "narrow" 
content. Thus, to know the content of our thoughts would imply that we know the 
singular contents as well, since the content of that particular thought, which we are said 
to know, contains singular content. And if this is knowable, he says us, then the 
Consequence Problem ought to succeed. McLaughlin and Tye' s denial that singular 
content is knowable in a privileged way thus denies we can know the content of our 
thoughts, even if we allow for two-factor theories. 
The problem is that according to McLaughlin and Tye, what we can know about 
our thoughts is only - even on a two-factor view - one of two essential content 
determining aspects. The other content determining aspect is not knowable. If they are 
committed to self-knowledge, then they must deny that the "wide" content plays a role in 
the determining of our thoughts. This denies externalism. If they are committed to 
externalism, then they concede that we cannot know part of our thought's content. But if 
we cannot know anything about a feature of our thought that determines its content, then, 
that implies we cannot know what our thought's overall content is . This denies self-
knowledge. 
J6 McKinsey (200 I, P 40). 
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What McLaughlin and Tye need, in order to remain committed to both self-
knowledge and externalism, is an argument that denies that we need to rule out 
alternative possibilities of different singular contents in order to know the contents of our 
thoughts. It is difficult to se how they could argue for this, whilst maintaining, as they do, 
that we lack knowledge of the singular contents of our thoughts because we cannot rule 
of the possibility of illusory singular contents. 
In Section V, I will show that Burge has available precisely this kind of argument, 
and so I will postpone further discussion of this possibility until then. Yet, as I shall 
show, on Burge ' s view, or the view that I will attribute to Burge, the singular contents of 
our thoughts are indeed knowable. Conceding that we cannot know the singular contents 
of our thoughts, as McLaughlin and Tye do, is conceding too much. 
(II) Brewer's Principle of Acquaintance 
Another possible response to the Consequence Problem is to deny that C2 (I am thinking 
that water is wet) is knowable to anyone who does not already know the conclusion. Thus 
the Consequence Problem does not provide us with any new knowledge of the world. In 
Brewer (2000), Bill Brewer puts forward this solution. The thought "water is wet", he 
argues, is impossible to have without the subject having "demonstratively based 
knowledge,,37 that water exists. 
The argument runs as follows. Brewer argues first that all externalist requirements 
are a consequence of the following principle, which he thinks is a "version of Russell ' s 
Principle of Acquaintance,,38 The Principle (henceforth A) claims: 
A persons' capacity to make determinate reference to certain objects and kinds in 
belief depends upon his having demonstratively based knowledge about them. 39 
Brewer then goes on to show that if this is true, the Consequence Problem dissolves, 
because Brewer's principle, A, contends that it is only possible to have a belief about 
37 Brewer, 2000 p. 421. 
38 Ibid, p. 421. 
39 Ibid, p. 421. 
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water, if we have demonstratively based knowledge of water. So, he claims, we cannot 
come to new, non-empirical, knowledge of the world this way, as knowing C2 is only 
possible for someone with the wherewithal to arrive at knowledge of its conclusion40. 
This knowledge, Brewer suggests, will come from something like reliable perception, or 
testimony, or something of the kind. 
Now Brewer' s argument for A runs as follows. The crucial claim for A is that: 
externalist relations are necessarily reason-giving relations, constituting a source 
of demonstratively expressible knowledge; where by this I mean reason-giving 
from the subject's point of view, rather than from the perspective of some externa l 
theorist41 
Now of course externalism is the view that it is the causal/perceptual relations between 
subject and world that give certain of his beliefs, or thoughts, their content - that is, what 
makes it possible for us to say that this belief is about this thing, and not the other thing. 
Now Brewer imagines we conceive of these relations as not reason-giving in his sense, 
but merely causal. Now if a person could have two possible contents for his beliefs, x and 
y then if these contents are not reason-giving then "a person ' s causal-perceptual relations 
with the things around him give him no more reason to believe that x than to believe that 
,,42 Y . 
If the conditions that lead to Oscar's belief that water is wet are merely causal, 
and not-reason-giving then the following will be true. In this case, Oscar would have 
been given no more reason to believe that water is wet, than he has to believe that twater 
is wet. Thus he does not and could not have any reason to believe that water is wet as 
opposed to twater is wet - precisely because the circumstances that determine the content 
of his beliefs do not give him a reason to pick one over the other. As a result, Brewer 
says, if this were the case, then believing that water is wet and believing that twater is wet 
are identical to Oscar - since neither belief is different for any reason, he will treat them 
as precisely the same. From this observation, Brewer claims: 
40 Ibid. p. 417. 
41 Ibid, P 42 1. 
42 Ibid P 422. 
34 
Hence the supposedly content-determining role of [Oscar's] environmental 
embedding is empty. For there is nothing more, or less, to the content of a belief 
than the way the subject takes the world to be. Thus, if the proposed causal-
perceptual relations in which a person stands to certain mind-independent things 
are not reason-giving relations, then they contribute nothing to the determination 
of specific worldly truth-conditions for his empirical beliefs about such things ... 
the content-determining relations between a person and certain things ... which 
are posited by the content-externalist are necessarily reason-giving relations.43 
To maintain that the relations that fix the content of a belief are not reason-giving leads to 
the following situation: 
A person believes that p and does not believe that q, even though he has, and 
could have ... no reason to believe thatp as opposed to believing that q ... It 
follows from this that the theorist in question is committed to a conception of 
belief content which is more discriminating than the subject's own understanding 
of the contents of his beliefs. For the theorist is obliged to distinguishp and q, 
even in the face of the fact that they are absolutely on par as far as the subjects 
actual or possible reasons for, or against, endorsing them are concerned ... This is 
surely unacceptable by anyone's standards. For the content of a belief is 
precisely ... the way the subject takes things to be.44 
So now Brewer has claimed that (from externalism) a person's causal/perceptual relations 
to the things in the world around him determine the content of some of his beliefs, and 
they do this by giving the person reasons to believe that p (that water is wet) rather than q 
(that twater is wet). The only way this could be possible is if this person could first be 
said to know that there is water around him - to know there is water, and not twater. 
From the fact that he is embedded in his particular environment, Oscar must be able to 
4J Ibid, pp. 422 - 423. 
44 Ibid, p. 424. 
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know that water exists, and this gives him a reason to believe that water is wet, and not 
that twater is wet. Note, again, that on Brewer's account, nothing contributes to Oscar's 
justification for his belief that he believes water is wet other than reasons Oscar has for 
believing water is wet. Oscar can know what he believes, presumably, by consulting what 
he has reason to believe, so I take it that this account does not threaten privileged access 
In anyway. 
Now the first point that must be noted is Davies,45 - that is that even if this is 
right, it still must be explained why this argument could itself not addfurther warrant to 
my belief that there is water in the world. Because even if it is possible to know C2 only 
if we already are in a position to know C3, it would still seem implausible to cite the 
argument used in the Consequence Problem as a further warrant for C3. So it must be 
explained how it is that someone knowing Cl and C2 could not - without falling back on 
the knowledge he's acquired through perception, or testimony, etc. - validly conclude 
that C3. So this solution does not solve all the problems unless used in conjunction with 
something like Davies' Limitation Principle, which will be discussed next, or some other 
solution to the Consequence Problem. If this solution is to work, then there is a lot more 
that needs to be explained. 
As shall become clearer later, there is also a deeper concern with this solution, 
insofar as it commits itself to answering the Achievement Problem in the same general 
way that Warfield does. I will deal with this strategy at a later point, for now, I shall 
restrict my argument to establishing that Brewer must be committed to a Warfield-like 
solution. 
Consider once more the slow-switching case endorsed by the Achievement 
Problem. As this example demonstrates, while being slowly switched between Earth and 
Twin Earth, Oscar would not be able to genuinely know that there is water in his 
environment. That much seems clear - a person being switched in that way cannot know 
whether there is H20 or XYZ around him at any time. The reliable perception, which, on 
Brewer's account, is supposed to give Oscar knowledge of water in his environment, is in 
this particular case no longer reliable, and thus insufficient for knowledge. In that case, 
from Brewer's response to the Consequence Problem, Brewer must conclude that Oscar 
45 Davies (2000, p. 388). 
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cannot know that he is thinking that water is wet; since that is only possible, he argues, 
for someone able to know that there is water in his environment. Since, on anyone's 
account of perceptual knowledge, the reality of a slow switch can be understood to 
undercut our ability to know that there is water in our environment, Brewer must concede 
that if a slow switch were actual, Oscar would not have the wherewithal to arrive at the 
conclusion "there is water in my environment". At thi s point, Brewer has two options. 
First he can claim that in this case, Oscar nonetheless can know that he is thinking that 
"water is wet". But then this serves as a counter example to his conclusion that it is 
possible only for a subject to think that "water is wet" if she possesses the wherewithal to 
arrive at the conclusion "there is water in my environment". This would undermine this 
as a possible solution to the Consequence Problem. Alternatively, Brewer must claim that 
in such a case, Oscar would in fact not know that he is thinking that water is wet. And as 
I will show in Section IV, the prospects of this stance are not good. 
(III) Davies' Limitation Principle 
The third kind of response to the Consequence Problem is that of Martin Davies. Davies 
argues that while one may know C I and C2, knowing these claims does not give us 
warrant to believe the conclusion. This is because Davies endorses the following 
Limitation Principle on the transfer of epistemic warrant. Now Davies's argument is that 
cases where warrant is not transmitted from premises of a valid argument to its 
conclusion will be "the analogue, within the thought of a single subject, of the dialectical 
phenomenon of begging the question,,46 The account of begging the question that Davies 
relies upon is Frank Jackson 's . According to Davies, this claims that: 
Given argument to given conclusion is such that anyone ... who doubted the 
conclusion would have background beliefs relative to which the evidence for the 
premises would be no evidence. 47 
46 Davies (2000, p. 394). 
41 Ibid, p. 396. 
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I wi ll not get into the intricacies of how Davies applies thi s explanation of begging the 
question to hi s Limitation Principle, as they are not relevant to the criticisms I will be 
making. It suffices, for my purposes, merely to say that from his assessment of begging 
the question, as well as from fine-tuning it to deflect counter examples Davies develops 
the following two principles: 
And: 
First Limitation Principle (multi-premise version): 
Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid argument to 
its conclusion if, for one of the premises, the warrant for that premise counts as a 
warrant only against the background of certain assumptions and acceptance (i) of 
those assumptions and (ii) of the warrants for the other premises cannot be 
rationally combined with doubt about the truth of the conclusion. 
Second Limitation Principle (multi-premise version): 
Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid argument to 
its conclusion if, for one of the premises, acceptance (i) of the assumption that 
there is such a proposition for the knower to think as that premise and (ii) of the 
warrants for the other premises cannot be rationally combined with doubt about 
the truth of the conclusion.48 
If correct, this does so lve the Consequence Problem. Ifwe are to accept premise Cl, then, 
ifwe were to doubt C3, we would have to have background beliefs that would suggest 
that there is no proposition for "water is wet" for me to possibly think. If! were to accept 
the proposition that " if I am thinking that water is wet, then my environment contains or 
did contain water" then the only way in which I wou ld be capable of doubting the 
conclusion of the argument, (that I am in an environment that contains or did contain 
water) would be if I doubted that I "water is wet" is a proposition I am capable of 
thinking. There is no other rational way to accept C I and not accept C3. So acceptance of 
the assumption that there is such a proposition for me to think as C2 and acceptance of 
" Ibid. p. 412. 
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the warrant for C I cannot be rationally combined with doubt about C3. Therefore, the 
Consequence Problem, if used dialectically, would be begging the question, and it is such 
an argument where warrant for the premises cannot be transmitted to its conclusion. 
Bill Brewer has responded to earlier versions of these principles by arguing that 
they have the consequence of making inferential knowledge of any necessary truths 
impossible, which is absurd as it 
places logic, mathematics, and, on many conceptions, philosophy, in a very poor 
position epistemically speaking. Something must have gone badly wrong with 
[Davies' Limitation Principles] . 49 
Davies ' response was to reformulate his Limitation Principles in such a way as to make 
them immune from such counter-examples. Whether or not Davies has succeeded in this, 
I will not get into here. Rather, I will argue that either Davies denies that non-perceptual 
knowledge is closed under known entailment, which would indeed place logic, 
mathematics and philosophy in a very poor epistemic position, or he is committed to 
something like Brewer' s Principle of Acquaintance (A). 
Now, in the previous chapter, I remarked that it appears that this Limitation 
Principle denies that knowledge is closed under known entailment; that if I genuinely 
know thatp, and I genuinely know that ifp then q, then I will be in a position to 
genuinely know that q. Davies, however, denies that this is indeed a consequence. Upon 
examination it becomes clear that Davies is right about this, however, as I will show, if 
Davies wants his solution to be consistent with the idea that knowledge is closed under 
known entai lment (henceforth, "closure"), then he is committed to a Brewer-like account 
of self-knowledge, as discussed in Section II. 
Closure in the above argument, and a purely a priori self-knowledge (in the sense 
that I can know I am thinking that "water is wet" without being in a position to know that 
there is water in my environment) are incompatible, if Davies is right. Either option, I 
will argue, is problematic. 
" Brewer (2001, pp. 420 - 421). 
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So how is Davies position compatible with closure? The idea that anybody who 
knows that p. and also knows that if p then q. is able to know q. is compatible with 
Davies ' claim that warrant for Cl and C2 is not transmitted to C3, because closure is not 
committed to the claim that it is the warrant we have for believing that p, and the warrant 
we have for believing that ifp then q, that gives warrant to believe that q. Closure does 
not require that it be the premises themselves supplying the warrant for q; it might be that 
the warrant we have to believe that q is from an entirely different source. That would not 
violate closure; all that is required for closure is that anybody who has warrant to believe 
p and if p then q will also have warrant to believe q. Our warrant to believe q need not be 
generated out of our warrant to believe those two premises. So there is no immediate 
incompatibility with Davies' solution and closure. 
The problem emerges when we consider from what source our warrant to believe 
a conclusion like C3 might stem. Now the Consequence Problem, recall , is a reductio ad 
absurdum against the compatibility of externalism and (a priori) self-knowledge, because 
of its absurd conclusion that we might have a priori knowledge of the external world. So 
it seems that if we want to deny thi s absurd conclusion, we must say that the warrant we 
have to believe C3 is based something we know a posteriori - and not a priori. The 
warrant for C3 must be grounded in some empirical observation, and not simply a priori 
theorising. 
That much is obvious. But it implies - if Davies wants to maintain closure obtains 
- that it is impossible for us to know both C 1 and C2 without also having made some 
empirical observation on the basis of which we can know C3. How might we explain 
this? Premise C 1 seems like it would be knowable, if at all, on possible worlds where 
there was no such thing as water. All that is required for it is for the sort of armchair 
reflection that led philosophers like Burge to devise their externalist accounts. Anybody 
who can reason like that can know C 1, and it would be bizarre to suggest that being able 
to reason like that is only possible on worlds that contain samples of water. 
To deny that one can know Cl without some kind of reason to a posteriori 
warrant to believe that there is water in their environment is absurd. Davies then, if he is 
to accept closure, must maintain that C2 is knowable only to people who are already in a 
position to know C3. But this, clearly, is precisely the position Brewer argued for, 
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discussed above. Thus, whatever problems there are with Brewer's account, will affect 
Davies, if Davies wishes to accept closure. If Davies retains a commitment to closure, 
then he accepts, like Brewer, that one cannot know that one is thinking that water is wet, 
unless one can know that there is water in one's environment. As remarked above, this 
implies that the reality of a slow-switch would undermine self-knowledge. In this next 
section, I will take issue with this position. 
But Davies will only be committed to this ifhe accepts closure. But what if we 
deny closure? This also is not something that we can deny unproblematically, given the 
context of the debate. The challenge the Consequence Problem raises only makes sense in 
the first place if we accept closure. If we deny thi s, then the Consequence Problem is all 
too easily dissolved - for of course we cannot know C3 a priori , since knowing C3 does 
not follow from knowing C I and C2. Without closure, we would have no special reason 
to expect people knowing C I and C2 to be in a position to know C3. To accept that 
knowledge is not closed is to deny the relevance of Davies' Limitation Principle to the 
solution of the Consequence Problem. Since Davies understands questions about the 
transmiss ion of epistemic warrant to be distinct from questions about closure, then it 
seems that he will need independent grounds for establishing that knowledge is not 
closed under known entailment, which he has not expressed, or committed himself to in 
thi s paper. Nor is it a solution that many protagonists in this debate would be comfortable 
with. Insofar as people think that the Consequence Problem is worth engaging with at all, 
it is safe to assume that they also think that accept a closure principle - at least for the a 
priori knowledge presented in each of the argument's premises. Ifwe are to deny closure 
for the a priori knowledge presented in the Consequence Problem's premises, then, 
clearly, the Consequence Problem must fail. For knowing, if we deny closure here, 
knowing that I am thinking that water is wet, and knowing what this entails (that I am in 
an environment that contains or did contain water) does not allow me to legitimately infer 
that I am indeed in an environment that contains or did contain water. So, any 
philosopher who takes the Consequence Problem seriously must assume that closure 
applies in this case. Closure, to such philosophers, must seem plausible . This then, would 
not help Davies provide a plausible so lution to the Consequence Problem. 
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There are also good independent reasons to consider the denial of closure 
dubious. Keith DeRose, for instance, calls the claim that I may know that p, know that p 
entails that q, but yet not know that q "the abominable conjunction", and describes it as 
"intuitively bizarre"so Indeed, a prominent proponent of non-closed knowledge, Fred 
Dretske, admits that the support for the claim that perceptual knowledge is not closed 
under known entailment derives from the fact that, if it were closed, in hi s view, 
scepticism would be true, and scepticism must be avoided. Dretske says, when 
considering why we should accept thi s position: 
One possible reason to abandon K-closure [the thesis that perceptual knowledge is 
closed under known entailment] is that its denial is not just a way to avoid 
skepticism, but the only way. This reason won't appeal to the skeptic, of course, 
but, if we could make a case for it, it might carry weight with those who find 
skepticism as "bizarre" or "abominable" as the rejection ofK-closure51 
This suggests that even Dretske admits that the idea that perceptual knowledge is closed 
under known entailment is itself compelling; so compelling in fact, that the best reason 
Dretske finds to abandon it is to show that if we accept it we are forced into denying an 
equally compelling position (that scepticism is false). 
However note that Dretske is committing himself only to denying the claim that 
perceptual knowledge, knowledge gained via perception, is closed under known 
entailment. This would be sufficient to defeat the scepticism Dretske wants to avoid. In 
this way, denying closure for non-perceptual knowledge, knowledge gained through a 
priori, armchair reflection, would have all the intuitive bizarreness with none of the anti-
sceptical benefit. Given self-knowledge is of this non-perceptual sort, as is the knowledge 
we can have of the truth of externalism, this suggests making a case for the denial of 
closure in the premises of the Consequence Problem would be considerably harder than 
making a case for the denial of closure for perceptual knowledge. This I take to offer 
" DeRose (I 995, p 28). 
'I Dretske (2003, p. 112). 
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good reason to avoid, if possible, the claim that closure is violated in the premises of the 
Consequence Problem. 
However, more pressingly, the denial of closure in non-perceptual knowledge is 
not only something to be avoided if possible, but is also a genuinely absurd conclusion. 
The reason philosophers like DeRose might consider the denial of closure "intuitively 
bizarre" is not just that it seems compelling. If closure did not hold, then we would 
effectively have undermined the epistemic support for a large proportion of the things we 
think we know. A great deal of philosophy operates with that assumption of closure in 
mind. Philosophical argument proceeds by putting forward premises, and coming to 
conclusions on the basis of those premises, in the manner that the Consequence Problem 
does. If we are to deny the link between knowing such premises and knowing the 
conclusions they generate, then have undermined a great deal of philosophical 
conclusions. 
Indeed, it is not just inferential knowledge in philosophy, or - as Brewer thought 
- of necessary truths, but all inferential knowledge that is undermined if we deny closure. 
Inferential knowledge proceeds by inferring a conclusion on the basis of a known 
entailment; and this is impossible if we deny closure of this sort obtains. This is clearly 
absurd, not only would philosophy, logic and mathematics be in a poor epistemic position 
as a result, but virtually all forms of human inquiry. Such a conclusion is thus 
unacceptab le; if this is indeed a consequence of Davies ' Limitation Principles, then, like 
Brewer, we should conclude that something must have gone badly wrong with it. 
The less problematic route for Davies to take here, thus, wou ld be to commit 
himself to a Brewer-like explanation; to claim that closure is not violated, and that rather 
it must be true that anyone knowing that they think "water is wet" must be in a position to 
know that water exists in their environment. As I mentioned in the previous section, this 
position is committed to the claim that the reality of a slow-switch must undermine self-
knowledge. The prospects of this avenue will be discussed in this following section . 
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(IV) Warfield and the Relevant Alternative Approach 
In this section, I will examine Warfield 's argument for why the Achievement Problem 
only undermines knowledge for the person being slowly switched - without this 
threatening the self-knowledge of someone not being slowly-switched. This is a position 
I have argued that Brewer must be committed to, and Davies as well - if Davies does not 
wish to deny closures2 . 
Warfield 's approach is to demonstrate that the slow-switching possibility that the 
Achievement Problem relies upon can only establish that Oscar, ifbeing slowly-switched, 
cannot know that he is thinking that water is wet. It does not demonstrate, Warfield 
thinks, that Oscar cannot know he is thinking that water is wet if he is not slowly-
switched. He understands the Achievement Problem to be formulated thus: 
P I To know that P by introspection, S must be able to introspectively discriminate P 
from all relevant alternatives ofP. 
P2 S cannot introspectively discriminate water thoughts from twater thoughts 
P3 If the Switching Case is actual, then twater thoughts are relevant alternatives of 
water thoughts 
Cl S doesn't know that P by introspectionS) 
To draw that conclusion, he thinks, is a fallacy, as it does not follow from the premises; 
since the premises are geared around one particular state of affairs, the conclusion that 
follows from them cannot apply to states of affairs different from the one in question. He 
says that the conclusion that Oscar, if slowly-switched, would lack self-knowledge is: 
relevant at most to the following question: 
Q: Given externalism, is it necessary that the contents of a thinker' s thoughts are 
knowable to the thinker on the basis of introspection? 
52 For the rest of this section I will operate under the assumption that Davies does not reject closure, and is 
thus committed to this position. 
SJ Warfield (1992, p. 218). 
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[The] argument has not, I maintain, shown anything about the compatibility of 
introspective self-knowledge and externalism. Rather, granting the assumptions of 
the Switching Case is logically possible, and all three premises are true, it has 
shown only that the answer to (Q) is "No,,54 
Warfield goes on to imagine a reply to his argument, claiming that we require that self-
knowledge be in some sense necessary. Warfield responds to this by denying that self-
knowledge needs such a requirement. 
In response to Warfield, first note that, given the difference in formu lations, my 
understanding of the Achievement Problem will escape the fallacy charge. That argument 
sets up general criteria for self-knowledge, and so its conclusion does in fact follow from 
the conclusion. Though in return, I take it Warfield will reject the strong condition it 
places on knowledge as implausible. I will not get into thi s matter at this stage. My 
criticisms will be more general than thi s sort of rejoinder would allow. 
In what follows I will argue that any normal, rational agent will be, at any time, 
capable offorming correct judgements about what he occurrently believes. The claim that 
any normal person would get such judgements wrong if the environment were to change, 
is implausible. Any account of self-knowledge that allows that such cases are possible is 
thus implausible. 
This is indeed the sort of account Warfield, Brewer and Davies are committed to, 
because they admit that the reality of a slow switch wou ld undermine Oscar's knowledge 
that he is thinking that water is wet. Now the Achievement Problem, as we have seen, 
relies upon the poss ibility of error to undermine knowledge. Thus, to accept that the 
Achievement Problem undermines knowledge at all (even if it is just in cases where the 
possibility of error is actual) is to accept that in such a case, Oscar genuinely does 
commit an error in his judgement about what he is thinking. He may think he believes 
that water is wet, but in fact he does not believe this - rather, he believes that !water is 
wet. 
" Ibid. P 219. 
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I further accept it as uncontroversial that the environmental changes would not 
affect Oscar's rationality, or any other part of his everyday functioning. For all intents 
and purposes, Oscar will behave as a normal rational agent, and the idea that this may 
change because of he is unknowingly shifting between a place that contains H20 in its 
environment to a place that contains XYZ in its environment, is absurd. In this way, 
according to Warfield, Brewer and Davies, in this case we would have a perfectly rational 
Oscar incorrectly ascribing occurrent beliefs to himself. His second-order judgements 
about his occurrent beliefs would thus conceivably be false - hence our second-order 
judgements about beliefs can conceivably be false, without any change in our functioning 
as a rational agent. 
In what follows, I will argue that any normal, rational agent must always have 
available a means of making true judgements about what his occurrent beliefs are. On 
this basis, I will conclude that Warfield , Davies and Brewer are committed to an 
implausible account of self-knowledge, and thus their position can be dismissed as a 
viable response to incompatibilism. 
Accepting this sort of possibil ity of error is to accept the possibility of what 
Sydney Shoemaker calls a "self-blind" person55 That is, a person who is capable of 
blindness regarding his own mental states, in the sense that he is capable of getting 
judgements about what he is occurrently thinking wrong. 
Shoemaker offers the following argument against the possibility of "self-
blindness" for rational creatures such as ourselves. If a person is self-blind in this way, 
then conceivably it is possible for him to make assertions like those commonly brought 
up in discussions of Moore's Paradox. The kind of assertion in question is of the 
following sort "it is raining, but I don't believe it is raining" . Despite difficulties in 
articulating what exactly is wrong with such an assertion56, it is evident that there is 
something logically improper about anyone sincerely asserting it. I cannot, without some 
logical failure, genuinely believe occurrently that the proposition "water is wet" is true, at 
the same time as occurrently believing the proposition "I don't believe that water is wet" 
is true. This much would appear obvious on reflection to any rational agent. 
" Shoemaker (1988, p. 34). 
S6 There is a great deal of literature here, but for two attempts to explain Moore's Paradox see Heal (1994) 
and Shoemaker (1995). 
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But if a person is self-blind, or at least self-blind about some of her beliefs, then it 
ought to be possible for her to not notice that she in fact does believe that it is raining. 
That is, a claim of the sort, "[ believe it is raining", should in principle be something that 
she can be wrong about. She ought to be able to assert " I don't believe it is raining" when 
in fact this is something she does believe. 
But if she can be wrong about this, then she ought to be able to hold something 
like "it is raining" (from her observations of the environment) while simultaneously 
holding that she does not believe that it is raining (from her examining the contents of her 
web of beliefs - whatever that entail s - and being mistaken). 
Shoemaker considers the possibility of a self-blind person (George) who due to 
his self-blindness becomes capable of asserting such statements. Assuming that George's 
self-blindness does not constitute a fai lure of rationality, it seems that upon asserting such 
a proposition, George would immediately notice that there is some logical impropriety in 
asserting it. As mentioned earlier, so much should be obvious to any rational agent. How 
would a rational person respond to this impropriety? I take it, as Shoemaker does, that a 
rational agent would seek to establish consistency between what he takes himself to 
believe and what to takes to be true. It is this discrepancy that generates the impropriety, 
and thus requires elimination. That much, too, I take as obvious on reflection to any 
rational person. A rational person would also note that the most direct way of doing this 
would be simply to alter his method offorming beliefs about his beliefs (whatever that is) 
so that he forms his second-order beliefs in correspondence with how he would he would 
respond to claims about the world. That is, George would note that to avoid the logical 
impropriety, he would need, when considering questions like "do [ believe it is raining?" 
to modify his answer so that its answer is the same as his answer to the question "is it true 
that it is raining?" [fhis answer to the second question is "yes", then George would 
understand that his answer to the first question must likewise be "yes", even ifhe fails to 
observe that belief within his framework of beliefs, and has independent reasons to think 
that this is not something he believes. 
At this point, however, Shoemaker notes that George is "beginning to look just 
like a normal person. There is nothing in his behaviour, verbal or otherwise that would 
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give away the fact that he lacks self-acquaintance"S7 This, Shoemaker takes as a reductio 
of the position that a rational person can be self-blind; by following the norms of 
rationality, we can come to a means of correctly judging what our beliefs in fact are. The 
presence of rationality insulates us from the logical error embodied in assertions like "it is 
raining, but I don't bel ieve it is raining"; and in this insulation, it offers us a reliable 
means of true second-order judgements. 
Without a failure of rationality then, it becomes difficult to see how any person 
could assert propositions like those of Moore's Paradox. Yet this ought to be conceivable 
for people capable of making errors in their judgements about their occurrent beliefs. 
Possessing rationality, for Shoemaker, is thus sufficient for possessing self-knowledge. 
Now as this argument suggests, the question of whether I believe that pis 
transparent to the question of whether p is true . And if that is the case, then insofar as I 
am rational, I will always be able to know whether I believe that p by considering 
whether I think there is good reason to think that p is true. If this condition of 
transparency obtains, then - as far as my occurrent beliefs are concerned - extreme 
failures in rationality aside, I have an infallible means of correcting judging what it is I 
believe. As such, without severe psychological breakdown, I will not be able to be wrong 
in the way that Warfield, Brewer and Davis are committed to saying that Oscar can be 
wrong. 
There is good reason, beyond the above considerations, to think that transparency 
obtains. Richard Moran points out: 
a first-person present-tense question about one's belief is answered by reference 
to (or consideration of) the same reasons that would justify an answer to the 
corresponding question about the world58 
When questioned about, say, whether or not I believe Thabo Mbeki is a good president, 
what is it I consider in giving an answer to this question? I do not direct my attention to 
some inner realm of psychological facts. Rather my attention moves outward; I consider 
" Ibid, p. 36. 
58 Moran (200 1, p. 62). 
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facts about Thabo Mbeki , about his policies and whether or not I consider them to be 
indicative of a good president or not. Moran claims that questions about my belief that p 
are in this way transparent to questions about the truth of p. Moran argues that beliefs are 
transparent in this way because enquiries into my own beliefs are undertaken in a 
deliberative spirit; a process of "deciding and declaring myself on the matter" rather than 
understanding questions about my belief as "a purely psychological one about the beliefs 
of someone who also happens to be me"S9 
These considerations support the idea that, from the first-person perspective, 
questions of whether I believe that p, are closely linked in some way to questions of 
whether p is true. Certainly, I cannot accept that certain claims about the world are inlact 
true, and deny that that I believe those claims. This offers powerful support for Moran ' s 
claim that questions about what we occurrently believe are answered by considering how 
we would answer to the corresponding question about the world - if beliefs are indeed 
formed this way, this would nicely explain why transparency is the case. 
Yet for my purposes, I do not need to argue that beliefs need be formed that way; 
all that is required for my argument is that by judging what I take to be true of the world, 
I can correctly arrive at what I occurrently believe. Insofar as this is available, and 
knowable to me, I will be able to correctly judge what [ occurrently believe. 
Let me clarify the argument, thus far. It is never possible, without a rational 
failure, for us to be able to assert propositions like "it is raining, but I don ' t believe it is 
raining". As far as occurrent beliefs are concerned, the discrepancy between how we take 
the world to be, and how what we take ourselves to believe about the world, does not 
arise. To be the sort of person capable of asserting "it is raining, but I don't believe it is 
raining" thus would require a substantial failure in rationality. Yet it appears that Oscar, 
insofar as he can be mistaken about what he occurrently believes, ought to be capable of 
asserting such propositions. This suggests that there is something wrong with any account 
of self-knowledge that allows that we can be mistaken about our occurrent beliefs 
without rational failure. 
A related point is that what we believe seems to be transparent to what we think is 
true. But this means that insofar as we are rational, and capable of forming judgements 
" Ibid, p. 63. 
49 
about the world, we ought to always have available an incorruptible ability to judge 
correctly about what our occurrent beliefs are . All it requires is that we recognise 
ourselves to accept certain things about the world to be true. If we can understand what 
we take to be true of the world, we can understand what it is we occurrently believe. And 
the slow-switching case ought not to impact on Oscar's ability to understand how he 
takes the world to be. It would be implausible to suggest that an unnoticed change in 
Oscar's environment impacts on his ability to accept certain propositions as true, and 
know he accepts them as true. If he can still answer negatively or positively to questions 
like: "do you believe that water is wet?" then he is capable of taking the world to be a 
certain way; he is capable of avowing certain things about the world. Thus, if he can 
truthfully answer "yes" to that question, and notice himself doing it, then he can know 
how he takes the word to be, and thus he can reason hi s way to a correct judgement about 
what he occurrently believes. 
Thus, if all this is correct, then, as Shoemaker says, rationality must be sufficient 
for the ability to correctly ascribe second-order beliefs to oneself. Insofar as he is rational, 
Oscar thus has an infallible means of arriving at true judgements about whether he 
believes "water is wet". Ifhe thinks the proposition "water is wet" to be true of the world, 
then he can correctly judge that right now he believes that water is wet. Hence the 
position that Warfield , Brewer and Davies make must be false - since if undergoing a 
slow switch Oscar could not on their view, correctly judge that he is thinking that water is 
wet. 
Burge also supports the above position. Like Shoemaker, he argues against the 
possibility of Oscar being rational, but incorrect, when he claims "I am thinking that 
water is wet". Burge argues that there is a necessary connection between judgements 
about our thoughts, and the thoughts themselves. Like Moran, he says that a rational 
agent will consider judgements like "I believe that water is wet" and "water is wet" from 
"the same points ofview,,6o This argument, which will be discussed in the following 
section, claims that second-order beliefs cannot be wrong without a failure of rationality. 
When I make a second-order judgement about what I believe (say, when I consider 
whether I believe "water is wet") it is done from the same point of view that I adopt when 
6() Burge ( \996, pp. 257 -258). 
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I wonder whether the claim "water is wet" is true. In this way, like Moran, Burge thinks 
that questions of what I believe are closely related to questions about what I think is true. 
What this means, however, is that when I say "I am thinking that water is wet" 
this must be true, unless I violate the norms of rationality. In considering whether or not 
this statement is true, for Burge, I will follow the same considerations that would justify 
an answer as to whether or not "water is wet" is true. I can only take the considerations to 
be sufficiently persuasive for me to accept "I believe water is wet" to be true, if! also 
take the conditions to be sufficiently persuasive for me to accept "water is wet" to be 
true. In this way, I cannot hold "water is wet" to be true, but not be able to, on reflection, 
come to the conclusion that "I believe that water is wet." And similarly, I cannot claim "I 
believe that water is wet" without also holding the claim "water is wet" to be true. In this 
way, Burge argues that claims about what I am occurrently thinking must be immune 
ji-om error - they will always be true, barring a failure of rationality. ([n the next section 
we will see more precisely how this is true even in the case of a slow-switch.). 
However, this applies only to occurrent beliefs; it is silent on the issue of whether 
or not, or how, we are correct in our judgements about what we have believed in the past. 
Yet that is sufficient for my purposes. Warfield, Brewer and Davies are committed to the 
claim that we can be mistaken in our judgements about our occurrent beliefs; according 
to them, Oscar may be wrong when he says that "I believe that water is wet". Thus the 
more limited focus on occurrent beliefs will suffice, since it is they are committed to a 
particular position regarding occurrent beliefs position. If Oscar is rational , then he ought 
not to be capable of error in the formation of his beliefs about his occurrent beliefs. 
Warfield, Brewer and Davies are committed to the claim that Oscar can in fact be 
mistaken in this regard, ifhis environment is set up in a palticular way. However 
claiming a slow switch undermines Oscar's rationality is implausible. As such, [ take 
these arguments to constitute good reason to reject this view. 
In the next section, [ will consider Burge's defence of compatibilism, the defence 
1 find the most plausible. 
(V) Burge, Immunity from Error and Critical Reasoning 
The Achievement Problem, recall, as I formulated it, proceeds as follows: 
A I) If I know that I bel ieve that water is wet, then I must know that I do not 
believe that twater is wet. 
A2) I do not know that I do not believe that twater is wet. 
A3) Therefore, I do not know that I believe that water is wet. 
Recall further that in justifying the first premise, I appealed to Stroud' s condition for 
knowledge, a condition that appears to follow the manner in which our everyday 
ascriptions of knowledge work. The condition was: 
if somebody knows that something, p , he must know the falsity of all those things 
incompatible with hi s knowing thatp (or perhaps all those things he knows to be 
incompatible with his knowing that p).61 
Understood like this, the role of the slow-switching case was to support the second 
premise of the above argument - the possibility of a slow-switch raises a poss ibility of 
error, it demonstrates a state of affairs that we cannot rule out, that would if actual 
undermine Oscar's knowledge that he is thinking that water is wet. Burge 's response to 
this problem is to reject the second premise of the above argument altogether - Burge 
argues that the slow-switching case does not actually demonstrate a poss ible state of 
affairs wherein Oscar would lack self-knowledge. 
Burge 's defence of this claim rests in his argument, mentioned briefly in the 
previous section, for the claim that the point of views of second-order judgements (" I am 
thinking that water is wet") and first-order thoughts ("water is wet") is in fact the same 
point of view. Burge responds to the Achievement Problem by pointing out that the 
second-order thought: "I am thinking that water is wet" is immune from error. That is, 
whenever you make a claim about what you believe in that sort of way, it is entirely 
61 Stroud (1984A , pp. 29 -30). 
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impossible for that claim to ever come out as false. In this way, then, Burge concludes 
that the negative force raised by the possibility of a slow-switch, is dissipated. And thus 
the Achievement Problem does not generate a genuine threat to se lf-knowledge. 
To provide some more detai l, hi s argument runs as follows: cogito-like 
(judgements about what I am currently thinking) are never wrong, because thinking the 
second-order thought ("I am thinking that water is wet") is possible to do only whilst 
thinking the corresponding first-order thought ("water is wet") so that the concept 
("water") expressed in the first-order is conceptually redeployed to the second-order. In 
this way, whatever the term "water" means in the first-order thought, it will mean the 
same thing in the second-order thought as well. This, for Burge, is because first- and 
second-order judgements operate from the same point of view. 
When we think about what we are thinking, according to Burge, and as 
demonstrated earlier, Moran, what we do is think about what is true about the world. 
Thus, if! ask the question: "do I think that water is wet?" my answer will be informed by 
the same sorts of considerations that I would look to if I was wondering " is it true that 
water is wet?" If! decide that I do believe that water is wet, that means that I have also 
decided that it is true that water is wet - and that involves thinking the proposition "water 
is wet". In this way, to answer in the affirmative to the second-order question is to think, 
at that moment, the proposition "water is wet". In this way, since the proposition "I am 
thinking that water is wet" is only possible to truly believe if one Simultaneously thinks 
"water is wet", since these judgements happen at the same time, whatever elements that 
contribute to the content of the one proposition, will contribute likewise to the content of 
the other proposition. The concept "water" then, must always be the same at both levels. 
So, for Burge, whilst we might not be able to tell whether we are expressing one 
particular concept by our term "water" or another distinct concept, we can still be said to 
know that we are thinking that water is wet. So, the possibility of a switch does not 
impact on our ability to know what we are thinking. Burge puts this as follows: 
Imagine a case of slow switching between actual-home and twin-home situations. 
In the former situation, the person may think "J am thinking that water is a 
liquid". In the latter situation, the person may think "I am thinking that twater is a 
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liquid". In both cases the person is right and fully justified as ever. The fact that 
the person does not know that a switch has occurred is irrelevant to the truth and 
justified character of these judgements62 
So, on Burge' s account, even though we cannot tell whether we are having water-
thoughts or twater-thoughts, we can still be said to know what we are thinking, when we 
say: "water is wet". 
So we have immunity from error, which thus withstands the Achievement 
Problem - which, as I explained, relies upon the assumption that alternative possibilities 
raise a possibility of error. What Burge is arguing, then, is that despite the possibility ofa 
slow switch, Oscar can know the falsity of all things incompatible with his knowing that 
water is wet. According to Stroud's requirement, the second premise in a standard 
sceptical argument offers a state of affairs, which we do not know to be false, which 
would be incompatible with our knowing that p. However, if Burge is right, then the 
second premise of the Achievement Problem does not present us with such a state of 
affairs. There is no possible way, save severe mental breakdown, for Oscar's assertion: HI 
am thinking that water is wet" to ever come out as false. 
However, it is at thi s point worth noting that questions ofajudgement's truth, are 
distinct from questions of ajudgement's epistemic status. To say that a belief is true, 
even infallibly true, does not alone entail that it must be construed as knowledge. These 
might be true for non-epistemic reasons - there might be some brute fact of the matter 
making it true, but yet not something we are justified in believing. Burge, however, 
acknowledges this point. 
On hi s view, it is also not accidental that these claims are never false. As Burge 
argues in Burge (1996), if these claims were only accidentally correct, and not correct in 
a way sufficient for genuine knowledge, we would not be able to function properly as 
critical reasoners - and of course we do function as critical reasoners. He says: 
if reflection were connected to the truth of our cogito-like judgements in an 
accidental or non-knowledge yielding way, the reason-guiding and rational-
62 Burge (1988, p. 122). 
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coherence-making functions of rational review [of our own thoughts] would be 
broken. Since part of our entitlement to reflective judgements about our 
judgements about our attitudes derives from their functions in critical reasoning, 
the entitlement itself would be undermined 63 
Critical engagement with our own beliefs and desires makes those beliefs and desires 
more reasonable. Now this, Burge argues, is possible only because our judgements about 
our thoughts are not only reliably true, but true in a non-accidental manner. If they were 
on ly accidentally true, then following those judgements would not make our beliefs and 
desires more reasonable - if one forms a belief on the basis of something only 
accidentally true, the modified belief would not have a better justificatory status than the 
original belief. However, in critically reflecting on our beliefs, and modifying them on 
the basis of that reflection, we clearly do improve the justificatory status of our beliefs. 
To deny this is to deny that critical reasoning has any epistemic value. If we want to hold 
that critical reasoning has epistemic value, we must concede that we possess self-
knowledge. And the fact that critical reasoning has epistemic value, seems unden iable. 
In this way, there seems to be no good reason to assert that we would lack 
knowledge in a slow-switch - our judgements would be true (because they are immune 
from error), and they would be true non-accidentally (because we are in fact critical 
reasoners) . What more could we want for a belief to count as knowledge? Thus, even 
Stroud 's strict requirement is satisfied - the possibility of a slow switch does not 
undermine our knowledge of our mental states in the same way that the possibility of the 
bird outside my window being a goldfinch, undermines my supposed knowledge that it is 
a canary outside. If Burge is right, then with cogito-likejudgements, cases like the 
canary/ goldfinch case do not ever occur. This is Burge's answer to the sceptical 
challenge the Achievement Problem offers. 
Burge has never to my knowledge responded directly to the Consequence 
Problem. Nonetheless, I think we can draw out his position merely from an examination 
of his solution to the Achievement Problem. In what follows, I will offer a response to the 
Consequence Problem that I think Burge has available to him - given his response to the 
63 Burge (1996, p. 250). 
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Achievement Problem. This is not an argument of Burge's, but merely the best argument 
I think Burge can make, given his solution to the Achievement Problem. 
In responding to the Achievement Problem, note that Burge has offered an 
account of how Oscar can know that he is thinking that water is wet, even though he may 
not be able to distinguish times when he is thinking that "water is wet" from times when 
he is thinking that "twater is wet". Oscar will not, on Burge's view notice the slow-
switch, and will be unaware that the concept he picks out when he utters "water" might 
be changing. Thus, it seems, Burge agrees with McLaughlin and Tye, that we need not 
know so much about our concepts to be able to infer anything specific in the 
environment. We don ' t need to know whether our concepts are dependent on the 
environment, or in what way they are, to know what we are thinking, if Burge is right. 
About this he says: 
to self-ascribe thoughts in the way expressed by that-clauses, one has to 
understand the thoughts one is referring to well enough to think them. One need 
not master anti-individualism, much less have an empirical mastery of the 
conditions that have established the identity of the thoughts one thinks 64 
In this way, it seems that Burge agrees with McLaughlin and Tye. Yet Burge need not, 
and I think would not, commit himself to the two-factor view endorsed by McLaughlin 
and Tye. There is an alternative explanation available to him. McLaughlin and Tye, 
recall, thought that the actual singular content of our thoughts was not something we 
could ever have privileged access to, yet there is another description of that thought under 
which we could be said to know it in a privileged way. However, this appeared to imply 
that we cannot know what our thoughts are, described in terms of their content, which 
itself implies that we do not know what the contents of our thoughts are. In explaining 
what it is about our thoughts that we can be said to know, McLaughl in and Tye appealed 
to a two-factor theory of thought content or of thought type, in order to maintain 
privileged access. To provide more detail on this matter, as McLaughlin and Tye 
understand it; we cannot have privileged access to our thoughts individuated in terms of 
64 Ibid, p. 244. Emphasis mine. 
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their content because we cannot rule out the possibility that they are not empty concepts 
(like would be the case if we lived on a Dry Earth, where we were collectively 
hallucinating that there was a clear, non-toxic liquid in the oceans and taps, etc.) This 
kind of possibility undermines our knowledge of our thoughts, individuated by their 
singu lar content. However, explaining it this way, requires them to posit a description of 
our terms under which they can be understood by us - and it was this aspect that required, 
problematically, a two-factor theory - McLaughlin and Tye need this to posit something 
else about our thoughts that we have access to. This was how they explained how it is 
that we can know what our thoughts are without knowing what exactly they refer to. 
Burge, on the other hand, need not explain the situation like this. On what I take 
Burge's view to be, the possibility of emptiness (that is, the possib ility of "water" being 
an empty concept like "phlogiston") does not undermine Oscar' s ability to know that he 
thinks water is wet, when he does, and twater is wet when he thinks that. That is, Burge 
does not concede that I cannot know the singular content of my thought because I cannot 
rule out the possibility of emptiness. Burge concedes this is a possibility I cannot rule out. 
However, on my understanding of his view, ruling out this possibility is not required for 
me to know the content of my thought. In this way the difference between the 
explanations is thus: McLaughlin and Tye retain higher requirements for knowing the 
contents of our thoughts (the need to rule out the possibility of emptiness) but posit 
another description of our concepts under which these requirements are met. Thus, they 
limit what it is that we have access to. Burge, alternatively, need not posi t another 
description of our thoughts described in terms of properties we can have access to, but 
can deny that we need to rule out the possibility of emptiness in order to properly know 
the content of our thoughts. Burge can limit the epistemic requirements, without altering 
what it is we have access to. One is, on hi s view, not required to rule of the possibility of 
emptiness, or even know very much about the content of our thoughts in order to know 
what it is. In the next chapter, I will return to these lower epistemic requirements in some 
detail. I will argue that they are in fact deeply-counter intuitive and thus implausible; 
knowing so littl e about the content of my thought, according to our own general 
intuitions about knowledge, is not sufficient for knowledge a/content. But I will leave 
this discussion until the next chapter. 
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How does Burge establish that these lower epistemic requirements apply? Again 
this is not something Burge has expressly argued for, yet I think he does have an answer 
available to him. We have seen, in his discussion of the contextually self-verifying nature 
of second-order thoughts, that there is an immunity from error in cogito-likejudgements 
- that is, judgements about what I am thinking. Further, we have also seen, given his 
discussion of critical reasoning, that these second-order judgements need not only be true, 
but be true non-accidentally. Thus, we have a substantive account of knowledge - we 
have something that is both always true, and non-accidentally so. Why then, should we 
have any reason to suppose that what has been described here is anything less than 
knowledge? What more should we require? It seems, given that these requirements are 
met, it would be unreasonable, or unrealistic to demand anything further of Burge ' s 
account of self-knowledge. Yet we have also seen that explained in this way, Oscar need 
not distinguish his water-thoughts from (if he has them) his twater-thoughts, or from his 
dwater-thoughts (the thoughts he ' d be thinking if slowly switched to a Dry Earth, where 
he hallucinated that there was a liquid in the taps and oceans). This is because Oscar 
cannot distinguish his beliefs in this way, and yet we have been given good reason to 
consider his beliefs knowledge. Thus the fact that Oscar cannot tell the difference 
between these thoughts is irrelevant. (Again, I will revisit this argument in more detail in 
the next Chapter). 
Thus, Burge can then explain also why the Consequence Problem is not a genuine 
problem for self-knowledge. In this way, Burge has an argument that can defeat both 
incompatibilist challenges. Accepting Burge's account thus appears the best response 
currently available to the compatibil ist. However, in the next chapter I wi ll argue that 
vital to this response is a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, and that, in this 
context, this transcendental argument can offer us no good reason to think that our 
judgements about our thoughts count as knowledge rather than mere belief if externalism 
is true. As such, despite its apparent success, Burge' S argument against the 
incompatibilist ultimately fails. 
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Chapter 3 
In the last chapter, I argued that Burge, of the compatibilists discussed, has the best 
response to the incompatibilist. However, I will argue that Burge's argument does not, in 
fact, provide us with a good reason to think externalism and self-knowledge are 
compatible. This, I shall argue, is because Burge resorts to a transcendental argument to 
establish that we must have self-knowledge, and this does not give us a good reason to 
consider our judgements about our thoughts as knowledge, rather than mere belief, if 
externalism is true. And, as I said in Chapter 1, to provide an explanation of how 
externalism and self-knowledge are compatible, Burge would need to give us a reason to 
think that our judgements about our thoughts count as knowledge, rather than mere 
belief. As such, Burge does not provide the explanation that is required in order to 
adequately answer the incompatibilist challenge. 
Burge's argument does establish that the access we do have to our mental states 
must be sufficient for knowledge. This question, however, must be understood as distinct 
from the question of whether or not the sort of access externalism implies we have, is 
sufficient for knowledge. There may be independent good reason to accept externalism -
but at the same time, as I will show, there is also independent good reason to think that 
the sort of access to the content of our mental states that externalism implies, is 
insufficient for knowledge. The premises of Burge 's transcendental argument for 
compatibilism could just as easily be used by the incompatibilist to offer a reductio of 
externalism. I will argue that without providing another argument for why we ought to 
accept his low epistemic requirements for knowledge of content, Burge has not provided 
a reason to accept that our judgements about our thoughts count as knowledge, rather 
than mere belief, if externalism is true. To provide a reason for this would entail showing 
that we have better reason to accept externalism than we have to deny his low epistemic 
requirements for knowledge of content, which is at this point not at all obvious. In this 
way, the truth of compatibilism cannot be established by Burge's present arguments 
alone. 
In Section I, I revisit the claim I made in Chapter 1 about how a proper response 
to the incompatibilist entails an explanation of how externalism and self-knowledge are 
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compatible, which in turn consists in offering us good reason to think that our judgements 
about our thoughts count as knowledge rather than mere belief, if externalism is true . In 
light of this I will examine the sort of answer Burge is giving to this question. 
In Section II, I will explain how Burge ' s answer to this question relies upon a 
transcendental argument, a type of argument that Stroud has influentially argued lacks 
dialectical force against a sceptic. However, I will also show that given what Burge's 
transcendental argument attempts to prove, these general criticism arguably do not apply. 
In Section III , I show that even if these general criticisms do not apply to Burge, 
his argument nonetheless lacks dialectical force against the incompatibilist. As I said 
above, this argument suffices to show that the access we do have to our mental states is 
sufficient for knowledge, but without a further argument, this is not an explanation of 
how externalism can be understood to be compatible with self-knowledge. 
In Section IV, I start to examine the implications ofthis conclusion. Here I argue 
that we cannot treat the conclusion that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible 
as merely a paradox. Rather, if we cannot establish compatibilism, then we ought to give 
up either self-knowledge or externalism. 
In Section V, I argue that we ought to give up externalism if we were to be unable 
to provide an adequate explanation of compatibilism. However, I argue that this has not 
been established conclusively in this dissertation; we also have to examine in closer detail 
the prospects of Burge's low epistemic standards. The question that must be answered, 
then, is whether we ought to accept Burge's low epistemic requirements, or abandon 
externalism. Which of these is the better alternative, I will leave as an open question. And 
on that point, I will conclude this dissertation. 
(I) Burge and Explanation 
As I argued in the first chapter, in raising the Achievement and Consequence Problems, 
the incompatibilist does not seriously mean to doubt that self-knowledge is possible. 
What the incompatibilist is asking for, I argued, is an explanation of how self-knowledge 
can be understood to be compatible with externalism. This sort of explanation, I further 
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argued, amounts to answering the following question: "why is it that our judgements 
about our thoughts count as knowledge, rather than mere belief, if externalism is true?" 
Thus, to point out that it is the case that we do or must possess self-knowledge, 
without explaining how it is that we have it if externalism is true is not to answer the 
question. For if we had good reason to believe that externalism was indeed incompatible 
with self-knowledge, the claim that we must possess self-knowledge could be taken as a 
reductio of externalism. That may answer a question about whether we have self-
knowledge, but not a question about how it is compatible with externalism. And the two 
questions must be understood as distinct. 
As I mentioned in the last chapter, we must also distinguish questions of truth, 
from questions of justification, warrant, or knowledge. To say that a belief is true is not 
the same as to say that it is justified, much less than that I know it. One is a claim about 
truth, while the other is a claim about epistemic status, and these claims must not be 
conflated. As William P. Alston says : 
We can quite properly be interested in what epistemic status [aJ belief has, and 
what gives it that status, without ever having any doubts as to its truth65 • 
To explain how a proposition must be true, is not to explain how it enjoys the epistemic 
status that it has (whatever that happens to be). Questions of truth and questions of 
epistemic warrant must be understood to be distinct; to explain how a proposition is true 
is not to explain how we have epistemic warrant to believe it. 
Now recall that Burge's solution to the Achievement Problem was to remove the 
possibility of error it required. However, by itself, this establishes only that the 
proposition "I am thinking that water is wet" cannot be false. This by itself, then , is not 
an explanation of how this can be something we can know. To establish that this is 
knowledge requires another argument. If Burge only established that our cogito-like 
judgements were never false , this would not necessarily explain why we should think that 
this is in fact knowledge. 
os Alston (2005, p. 197). 
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Burge is aware of the need to say more in this regard. In Burge (1996), he sets out 
to explain the warrant we have for our beliefs more thoroughly than pointing to their 
contextual self-verifying nature. He says: 
noting that [a cogi/o-like thought] is self-evidently self-verifying ... would not 
capture fully what is involved in its epistemic status66 
In Section IIJ, I will argue that Burge's explanation of how Oscar can know he is thinking 
water is wet is inadequate. Whilst Burge does explain how claims like "I am thinking that 
water is wet" cannot be false, he does not give us good reason to take it to be knowledge, 
if externalism is true. 
Burge, recall, goes on to ground the entitlement we have to our own mental states 
in our capacity for critical reasoning. Burge argues that being rational agents, capable of 
rationally and critically engaging with our own thoughts, requires that we have an 
entitlement to make judgements about our mental states, and that these judgements 
normally be correct in a non-accidental way. On the basis of such considerations, Burge 
concludes, regarding the entitlement we have to our mental states: 
The entitlement remains constant under possible unnoticed variations in 
environmental circumstances or cognitive content. For it does not depend on 
checking whether or judgements meet certain conditions. It depends on the 
judgements ' being instances of a kind essential to critical reasoning. Critical 
reasoning presupposes that people are entitled to such judgements. Since we are 
critical reasoners we are so entitled67• 
Thus Burge offers a more substantive account of the epistemic entitlement or justification 
basis of self-knowledge by grounding self-knowledge in critical reasoning. Burge can 
show that critical reasoning requires that our judgements about our occurrent thoughts be 
66 Burge (1996. p. 241). 
67 Ibid, pp. 262 - 263. 
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true, and be true in a non-accidental manner. What more should we require in an account 
of self-knowledge? 
At thi s point, one may be tempted to understand such a story as a good reason to 
think of our judgements about our thoughts as knowledge rather than belief - and as, 
such, prov id ing the required explanation. Burge's explanation runs as follows: any 
critical reasoner must possess self-knowledge. Thus, we have good reason to think that 
critical reasoners necessarily possess some reliable belief forming mechanism, so that our 
beliefs about our mental states is a reliable guide to what our mental states really are like. 
However, in the next two sections, I will argue that this in fact does not provide us 
with good reason to consider our judgements knowledge rather than belief - because the 
argument Burge uses is transcendental, which, I hope to show, cannot be employed to 
successfu lly in this context. However, as I will argue, this argument is not based on 
Stroud's argument that transcendental arguments require a prior means of bridging the 
gap between mind and world . 
(II) Transcendental Arguments: General Problems 
What, in the first place, is a transcendental argument? In his introduction to the collection 
Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects Robert Stern says: 
The first, and perhaps most definitive feature, is that these arguments involve a 
claim of a dist inctive form: namely, that one thing (X) is a necessary condition for 
the possibility of something else (Y), so that (it is said) the latter cannot obtain 
without the former68 
Understood like this, then , Transcendental Arguments might proceed something like this: 
Tl) X is a necessary condition for Y 
T2) Y obtains, 
T3) Therefore, X obtains 
68 Stern (1999, p. 3). 
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Jfthis is right, then it looks like Burge's argument is indeed transcendental ; it proceeds, 
as the above quoted passage from Burge demonstrates, roughly as follows: 
BTl) Self-knowledge is a necessary condition for critical reasoning 
BT2) We are critical reasoners 
BT3) Therefore, we must have self-knowledge 
That Burge's argument here is transcendental, is in fact noted by Stern in his introduction 
- Stern explicitly cites the above argument as a "less well-known" transcendental 
argument, which has been debated less than the other influential recent uses of these 
kinds of arguments - namely the transcendental arguments of Davidson, Putnam and 
Searle69 
Burge, we have seen, using this transcendental argument to give us good reason to 
think of our judgements about our mental states as knowledge, and not mere belief, as the 
sceptical argument the Achievement Problem uses suggests. However, objections raised 
by Stroud against the use of transcendental arguments in general, suggest that 
transcendental arguments lack dialectic force against the sceptic, as they presuppose a 
prior, and controversial, means of bridging the gap between mind and world that would, 
if true, offer and independent refutation of scepticism. Jfthese objections apply to Burge, 
then his argument, as a response to the Achievement Problem, would not have succeeded 
in giving us reasons to think of our judgements about our thoughts as knowledge, rather 
than mere belief. And therefore, would not have succeeded in providing the required 
explanation. J will go into these objections in more detail momentarily, but first J will 
make some cursory points about Burge' s employment of a transcendental argument in the 
debate regarding self-knowledge and externalism . 
It is interesting that Burge uses a transcendental argument here - especially given 
the prominence in the debate of the Consequence Problem. Like Burge's argument, the 
Consequence Problem follows the form Stern associates with transcendental arguments. 
Observe: 
69 Ibid. p. I. 
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C 1) If I am thinking that water is wet, then I must be in an environment that 
contains or did contain water. 
C2) [ am thinking that water is wet. 
C3) Therefore, I am in an environment that contains or did contain water. 
Clearly, then, the above argument form is transcendental ; it begins by considering that 
some state of affairs (my thinking that water is wet) is only possible if certain conditions 
are met (I am in or have been in a watery environment) and concludes, given that such a 
state of affairs is real (I am indeed thinking that water is wet) that its conditions thus must 
be actualised (So I must be, or have been, in a watery environment). However, this 
conclusion is understood in this argument to be absurd; one cannot, the incompatibilist 
thinks, establish that water exists in my environment by means of such an argument. The 
fact that transcendental arguments are prominently used in this context as a reductio 
ought perhaps to immediately rai se some suspicions about their legitimacy. I will return 
to the links between transcendental arguments and the reductio arguments later on. 
For the moment, however, I will articulate Stroud's influential criticisms of 
transcendental arguments, in order to see whether they would apply to Burge' s argument. 
The move of a transcendental argument that, since Stroud, is considered problematic, is 
the move from a psychological fact, which is essentially what critics understand premise 
Tl to be, to a non-psychological fact - T3. 
The problem is that the sceptic may respond (0 T I by claiming that it only seems 
that X is a necessary condition for Y - that this is in fact merely a fact about how we see 
the world , rather than a fact about how the world is. Or, if we define Y in such a way that 
X is required for it, then the sceptic may deny that Y, defined in that way, genuinely 
obtains. The problem is that it seems that saying that X is necessary for Y is a conceptual 
claim - but, in general, one of the things the sceptic doubts is whether or not our concepts 
or thoughts about the world genuinely correspond to what is in fact in the world. In order 
to establish that it follows from our thinking that X is necessary for Y, to the fact that X is 
necessary for Y, Stroud thinks that some version of the verificationist principle is 
required - some principle that confines questions of what is meaningful to questions of 
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what is empirically knowable. On this view, statements about unknowable things are 
meaningless. To establish that any claim X really is necessary for Y (call this claim'S') 
what is required is to show that conceptual link between X and Y must apply to the real 
world - that given what X and Y mean it must be true that X and Yare genuinely, in the 
real world , connected the way we think they are . But thi s implies a connection between 
something being meaningful , and something being true. But to say that is to endorse a 
form of verificationism. As Stroud says: 
Any opposition to scepticism on this point [denying that S really is true, rather 
than merely making sense to us without being true] would have to rely on the 
principle that it is not possible for anything to make sense unless it is possible for 
us to establish whether S is true, or alternatively, that it isn 't possible for us to 
understand anything at all if we know only what conditions make it look for all 
the world as if S is true, but which are still compatible with S's falsity. The 
conditions for anything' s making sense would have to be strong enough to include 
not only our beliefs about what is the case, but also the poss ibility of our knowing 
whether those beliefs are true; hence the meaning of that statement would have to 
be determined by what we can know. But to prove this would be to prove some 
version of the verification principle, and then the sceptic will have been directly 
and conclusively refuted.7o 
Ifwe dispute the sceptic's claim that TI is merely a psychological claim on any other 
ground other than endorsing verification ism, we will run into similar problems. This can 
be understood when we consider what must be done to establish the first premise as a 
non-psychological fact. To establish the first premise as a non-psychological fact is to 
establish it as a very strong modal claim - about how things must necessarily be in the 
world order for Y to obtain. The issue is that it seems the first premise is established by 
means of an a priori analysis of our own thoughts and concepts - our own way of 
looking at the world. The question , in essence, thus becomes: how can we make a strong, 
modal claim about the world, if the only evidence we use for thi s claim is based on 
70 Stroud (1968, p. 24). 
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investigation of our thoughts and concepts of the world? A sceptic, as Stroud points out, 
can very plausibly maintain that despite the strong conceptual support for the first 
premise, this is nonetheless simply based on our - perhaps unavoidable - particular way 
of looking at the world, rather than on the way the world really is. In this case, then it 
seems we have a gap between how we understand the world to be, or our concepts, and 
how the world really is. Some independent means of bridging this gap is required for the 
transcendental argument to work. As Robert Stern says, in this way, transcendental 
arguments lack dialectical force against the sceptic - that is, they presuppose either 
verificationism, which by itself would refute scepticism, or some other means ofclosing 
the gap between concepts and world that would in itself offer an independent refutation 
of most forms of scepticism 7I And if that is the case, then the transcendental argument 
offers no new solution to scepticism. 
So the reason that the above argument lacks dialectical force is because we can 
assume the sceptic to oppose the move from psychological fact (T I) to non-psychological 
fact (T3). Yet it is not clear that the incompatibilist would resist the move from how we 
think about the world, to how the world really is. Why would the incompatibilist oppose 
this? The incompatibilist is not a sceptic; she does not rely upon this sort of general gap 
between mind and world in making her argument. Indeed, if the incompatibilist is indeed 
committed to scepticism, that may be construed as hurting her position, as I will discuss 
in Section IV. And insofar as the incompatibilist can plausibly be understood to accept 
that what we think is required for self-knowledge is what is in fact required , then, in this 
context, Burge can legitimately assume that there is no general gap here. Given the 
differences in what the sceptic accepts from what the incompatibilist accepts, these 
general criticisms thus cannot apply to Burge's argument. 
In this way, Burge can legitimately use a transcendental argument here; we have 
thus far no reason to suppose that Burge's argument indeed lacks dialectic force against 
the incompatibilist, and thus can then be seen as providing a reason to think of our 
judgements about our thoughts as knowledge. 
71 Stern, (1999, pp. 6 - 7). 
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However, there is another reason to dismiss it as an adequate explanation of why 
our judgements about our thoughts count as knowledge rather than belief, if externalism 
is true. In the next section, I will put forward my argument for this claim. 
(III) Burge's Transcendental Argument: Specific Problems 
To clarify my claim, let me return to what was miss ing from Burge's contextually self-
verifying argument against the Achievement Problem. 
I noted above that pointing out that the claim "I am thinking that water is wet" is 
immune from error does not, by itself, give us a reason to think we know what we are 
thinking. This is not an explanation of the epistemic status of that belief, or how it can be 
considered knowledge. 
Why might we consider the claim "I am thinking that water is wet" not to count 
knowledge, if externalism is true? Or, more specifically, why might we consider the 
claim "I am thinking water is wet" not to count as knowledge of content if externalism is 
true? As I made clear in Chapters I and 2, what we require in an account of self-
knowledge is that it delivers knowledge of the content of our thought - if it offers on ly 
knowledge of something other than that thought's content, then this is an inadequate 
account of self-knowledge. In this way, what is required here is knowledge of a particular 
feature of that thought - I not only need to know something about this thought, I need to 
know its content. In this way, there is in fact a particular feature of my thought that needs 
to be knowledgeably avai lable to me. Now, as I wi ll show, it seems far more plausible to 
claim that I do not know the content of my thoughts, if externalism is true, given our 
common and strongly held intuitions about the requirements for knowledge. Rather, it 
seems, if externalism is true then I can only know some other feature of it. 
As I noted in Chapter 2, this claim is supported by McLaughlin and Tye. They 
point out that we can only know our thought when we type them in terms of certain 
properties they have - not all properties. This implies we cannot know all properties of 
our thoughts. We cannot for example, know (at least not in the manner required for self-
knowledge) our thoughts when typed in terms of the brain states they correspond with. 
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This seems quite clear - imagine my thinking "water is wet" happens to be regularly 
correlated with C-fibres firing in my brain. This relation is thus a property my thought 
does have. But if! am asked whether J am thinking a thought that regularly occurs at the 
same time as C-fibres firing in my brain, I might in fact reply I am not (assuming I have 
some other, mistaken opinion). This clearly indicates that I do not know my thoughts, 
when typed in terms of the relations they have to my phys ical brain states. And from thi s, 
it seems obvious that we can conclude that I do not know this particular property of my 
thoughts. To suggest I know my thought "water is wet" regu larly corresponds with C-
fibres firing in my brain in this case would seem ludicrous. I do not have privileged 
access to this feature of my thoughts - I have privileged access only to another feature of 
my thoughts. 
Now, in a similar way, Oscar might not know that when he thinks about "water" 
he is in fact thinking about a substance with a particular chemical composition. If we ask 
Oscar whether he is thinking about a stuff made up of H20, he might reply that he is not. 
Yet according to externali sm, "H20" is still part of the propositional content of Oscar' s 
thought, when Oscar thinks about "water" . In this way, it looks like Oscar does not know 
his thought, when typed in terms of its singular content. This is precisely what 
McLaughlin and Tye concluded -and they further thought that any claim that this is 
something we could know, was "absurd". Now, as we noted in the above example, if we 
cannot know a thought when it is typed in terms of certain properties, this implies we 
cannot know that it has these properties. This, then, implies we cannot know the singular 
contents of our thoughts. 
Yet, as I argued in Chapter 2, externalism implies that the content of certain 
thoughts is singular. From all this then, it seems that we cannot know the content of our 
thoughts if indeed externalism is true. 
Now Burge, I suggested, wou ld claim that we can indeed know the singular 
content of our thoughts. This is because Burge endorses lower epistemic standards for 
knowledge of content than do McLaughlin and Tye. To reiterate, McLaughlin and Tye 
think I do not know the singular content of my thought because its singular content may 
be different from how I take it to be (in the sense that J might not take the content of 
"water" to be "H20", in the manner described above). As a result of these sorts of 
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possibilities of error, I do not, on McLaughlin and Tye ' s view, genuinely know what 
singular content it has. 
I also argued that Burge would deny this. He does not require that we be able to 
rule out such possibilities in order to know the content of our thoughts. Hence his 
epistemic requirements for knowledge of content are lower than McLaughlin and Tye's. 
On Burge's view, Oscar can know the content of his thought, even when H20 is in fact 
part of this content. In support of this, to repeat, he says: 
to self-ascribe thoughts in the way expressed by that-clauses, one has to 
understand the thoughts one is referring to well enough to think them. One need 
not master anti-individualism, much less have an empirical mastery of the 
conditions that have established the identity of the thoughts one thinks72 
Burge's explanation of self-knowledge thus is committed to the following position : I do 
not need to have discovered the chemical composition of water in order to know what I 
am thinking about when I'm thinking about "water". Yet H20 is the singular content of 
my water-thoughts, and this singular content, on Burge's view, must be knowable. As 
opposed to McLaughlin and Tye, who think that the fact that I may have mistaken beliefs 
about what the singular content of our thoughts means we cannot know this content, 
Burge's account entails that we can know the singular contents of our thoughts ("water") 
when I might in fact have many mistaken beliefs about what the term "water" is supposed 
to refer to. If someone asks Oscar whether his thought has singular content, he might 
reply that it has none; even so, Oscar, on Burge ' s account, knows the singular content of 
his thought. 
But this seems intuitively bizarre. We do not - and should not - consider Oscar to 
be able to know that his thought corresponds with C-fibres firing in his head. This is 
because if we described the thought in that manner to Oscar, he might well honestly deny 
that it is in fact the thought he is thinking. Given his honest denial that he is thinking a 
thought corresponding with C-fibres firing in his brain , it seems the property of being 
72 Burge (1996, p. 244). Emphasis mine. 
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regularly correlated with C-fibres in his brain, is not a property of his thought that Oscar 
knows. 
Similarly, since Oscar might honestly deny that he is thinking about H20, and 
since "H20" forms part the content of that thought, it makes sense to deny that Oscar can 
know his thought, when typed in terms of its singular content. Which implies, as we have 
seen, that the actual content of his thought, is not a property of his thought that Oscar can 
know either. 
This intuition that these sorts of possibilities of error need to be ruled out in order 
for something to count as knowledge, does not stem from an intuition like the one 
underpinning the sceptical challenge. Alternative possibilities are not at issue here. All 
this intuition stems from, is the intuition that if Oscar does not seem to believe that 
"H20" forms part of the content of any proposition he thinks, then this cannot be 
something he knows. Yet, this is something he is required to know, ifboth self-
knowledge is true, and externalism is true. "H20" is vital component of the content of 
Oscar's water-thoughts, and Oscar, for all intents and purposes gives us no reason to 
suppose he believes this. As such, it does seem strongly counter-intuitive to suggest that 
Oscar can know what the actual content of hi s water-thought is. If Oscar seems to know 
very little about the singular content of hi s thoughts, in the sense that he might 
completely misdescribe it, then it seems bizarre to suggest that he knows what the 
singular content of his thought is. It would be far more reasonable, in such a case, to 
conclude that Oscar only has an epistemically privileged access to some other feature of 
such thoughts - not their singular content. But from this it appears to follow that Oscar 
does not know the singular content of his thoughts - in the same way that it seems clear 
that Oscar does not his thought corresponds with C-fibres firing in his head. If our 
knowledge of content is answerable to the same requirements as our knowledge of the 
relational properties of our thoughts, then it would seem undeniable, in this case, that 
Oscar does not the content of this thought. Neither singular content, nor the relation it 
bears to his brain seems to be known to Oscar, according to these requirements. 
Knowledge of content, thus, must be seen, on Burge's view, to have much lower, 
or at least very different requirements than our requirements for other forms of 
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knowledge 73. How can we accept such low requirements for knowledge of content? What 
reason does Burge give for why we should accept these standards as sufficient for 
knowledge? 
The best reason for this will emerge from Burge's transcendental argument. Burge 
has argued that without rational failure we must possess self-knowledge. Thus, since 
there are in fact cases where we cannot achieve requirements higher than the standards 
discussed above, we might conclude that these lower epistemic requirements must be 
sufficient for knowledge of content. Since we must possess self-knowledge, and because 
these cases of error sometimes occur, it follows from those considerations that to know I 
am thinking "water" I need not be know much about its content, in order to be said to 
know what content it has. 
Burge, then proceeds in this way; in arguing for these standards, he establishes 
that we do and must possess self-knowledge. He then argues that the Achievement and 
Consequence Problems establish that we cannot achieve higher standards than these, if 
externalism is true. He then concludes that the lower standards, the ones we do achieve, 
must be sufficient for knowledge. This then, would be Burge's argument for the lower 
requirements: 
A) We must have self-knowledge because we are critical reasoners. 
B) We can only achieve lower epistemic requirements, according to externalism. 
C) Therefore, lower epistemic requirements must be sufficient for knowledge. 
Note, at this point, that the conclusion does not follow from the argument's premises, 
since there is nothing in the above argument to say that we do only achieve the lower 
epistemic requirements. This can be modified as such: 
0) We must have self-knowledge because we are critical reasoners. 
E) We can only achieve lower epistemic requirements, according to externalism. 
F) Externalism is true. 
13 Burge could supposedly, deny this and claim that all forms of knowledge need only meet these 
requirements. But if this is the case, then we have no good reason to deny that Oscar knows that his thought 
correlates with C-fibres firing in his brain. But to say that Oscar might know this, clearly, would be absurd. 
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G) Therefore, lower epistemic requirements must be sufficient for knowledge. 
However, even with this modification, there is no reason to suppose that the 
incompatibilist need accept, or would want to accept, this argument. The suggestion that 
Oscar might know what the singular content of his thoughts are in instances where he 
may be mistaken in an assessment of what the content of his thought is, might be taken to 
be intuitively bizarre, to the same degree that philosophers like DeRose find the claim 
that knowledge is not closed under known entailment intuitively bizarre. It certainly 
wou ld be utterly bizarre to suppose that Oscar genuinely knows that his thought has the 
property of being correlated with C-Fibres firing in his brain, after all. This would be at 
least as bizarre as the denial of closure. Yet, it seems, Oscar may in some cases have as 
much access to his thoughts, typed in terms of their singular content, as he does to his 
thoughts typed in terms of the relations they hold to his brain. Burge's lower epistemic 
requirements clearly cannot plausibly apply to knowledge of the relations our thoughts 
have to our brains. To claim this would be intuitively bizarre. So why should we think 
they are less bizarre when applied to knowledge of content? If! believe that I am thinking 
about any clear, tasteless liquid when I think about "water", then it seems I do not know 
that I am in fact thinking about H20. Yet H20 is the singular content of my water-
thoughts, and this, on Burge's account, is knowable without any empirical research. 
And as we saw in the last chapter, the supposed "bizarreness" of the den ial of 
closure, as Dretske acknowledges, has led some philosophers to treat any argument in 
favour of that conclusion to be a reductio of the position endorsed; it is too counter-
intuitive, they think, to take seriously. 
Thus a similar claim might be made about the lower epistemic standards endorsed 
by Burge. The claim that I know the singular content of my thought in cases where I 
believe that this thought has different content, seems as counter-intuitive as the claim that 
perceptual knowledge is not closed under known entailment. The position Burge 
maintains is in this way intuitively bizarre, and difficult to take seriously. 
Burge 's support for these lower epistemic requirements, we noted, stems from his 
claim that if they are insufficient for knowledge, then we lack self-knowledge. This then 
might be considered analogous to Dretske's argument, quoted earlier: 
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One possible reason to abandon K-closure [the thesis that perceptual knowledge is 
closed under known entailment] is that its denial is not just a way to avoid 
skepticism, but the only way. This reason won' t appeal to the skeptic, of course, 
but, if we could make a case for it, it might carry weight with those who find 
skepticism as "bizarre" or "abominable" as the rejection ofK-closure.?4 
Like Dretske, Burge endorses a counter-intuitive position on the basis that it seems that 
only in endorsing this position can self-knowledge can be had - assuming the truth of 
externalism. 
Yet this gives us some reason to think that externalism is false. The situation is as 
follows; if we accept externalism, it seems we must accept one of two counter-intuitive 
positions; either we lack self-knowledge, or we must accept Burge's lower epistemic 
standards as sufficient for knowledge. Both seem highly counter-intuitive. In Chapter 1, I 
said that if it could be shown that accepting externalism leads to intuitively bizarre 
consequences, this would diminish the support we have for externalism . As Boghossian 
points out, the support for externalism derives largely from the intuitions brought out by 
the Twin Earth thought experiments. The support of externalism is that it appears the 
only way we can explain the fact that Oscar and Toscar will be having different thoughts ; 
the conclusion that they are having separate thoughts, is supported by our intuitive 
responses to the thought experiment. As Boghossian says: philosophers accept 
externalism "because their intuitive responses to a certain kind of thought experiment.. . 
appear to leave them little choice,,?5. If externalism could be shown to have intuitively 
bizarre consequences, this would substantially diminish the primary support for the 
position. 
That we must accept externalism, in thi s situation, is no longer so obvious. We 
could consider the "absurdity" of the lower epistemic requirements sufficient to show that 
externalism must be false, or we could consider the support for externalism sufficient to 
establish that the lower requirements must be true. The argument that the compatibilist 
74 Dretske (2003, p. 11 2). 
" Boghossian (1998, p. 273). 
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treats as a transcendental argument for the lower requirements, the incompatibilist treats 
as a reductio against externali sm. It is by no means clear which would be the better way 
to proceed. 
However, if this is the position Burge is in fact in, then he has not yet provided us 
with a reason to think that, if externalism is true, our judgements about our thoughts will 
count as knowledge as opposed to mere belief. How we respond to the considerations 
Burge raises seems largely a matter of intuition. Why should we accept that his lower 
epistemic requirements are sufficient for self-knowledge rather accept that externalism is 
in fact false? At present, there seems no means of deciding this question. As such, we 
have not been given a good reason to think of our judgements about our thoughts as 
knowledge rather than belief, if externalism is true. 
To provide such a reason, what must be establi shed is that it is more reasonable to 
endorse the lower epistemic requirements than to abandon externalism . To do this he 
must establish that these consequences are in fact not intuitively bizarre - or not as 
bizarre as the denial of externalism. To establish that, however, would require not only an 
argument for externalism, but also a thorough examination of our intuitions regarding 
requirements for knowledge, and showing that our common understanding of knowledge 
does not commit us to anything stronger than these lower requirements in this context. 
Yet, to do that, I take it, would require a separate argument. 
In this way, it becomes clearer why Burge's transcendental argument for self-
knowledge cannot adequately answer supply the reason we are looking for. 
Transcendental arguments proceed by offering premises that we must accept, extracting 
the necessary conditions for the truth of these premises, and then concluding that these 
necessary conditions must be true. In this particular case, however, it isn't clear whether 
it wou ld be more reasonable to deny one of the premises to avoid the conclusion, rather 
than accept the premises and be committed to the conclusion. An alternative manner of 
responding to Burge' s argument for the lower epistemic requirements would be to 
combine Burge's considerations with the intuition that his conclusion must be false, to 
argue that one of his premises (externali sm is true) must be false. Whether we should 
treat his premises as a transcendental argument for the lower epistemic requirements, or 
as a reductio ad absurdum of externalism is not yet established. As such, we have not 
75 
been given a good reason to think that our judgements about our thoughts count as 
knowledge, rather than mere belief, if externalism is true. Burge's transcendental 
argument thus offers no explanation of how self-knowledge is possible if externalism is 
true . 
(IV) Implications: Incompatibilism as Paradox 
I have argued that the incompatibilist has been asking for is an explanation of how self-
knowledge is compatible with externalism - and I argued that this requires us to supply a 
reason to suppose our judgements about our thoughts count as knowledge, rather than 
mere belief, if externalism is true. I have also argued that thus far no such reason has 
been given. 
From what I said above, a reason could be given if it could be established that 
Burge's low epistemic requirements are in fact not as intuitively bizarre as they first 
appear. I do not intend to make this argument here - as it stands, I have no idea what a 
plausible argument for this would look like. 
Rather than offering this answer, in this section I will consider the implications of 
what I have established. Does a lack of this kind of explanation entail that we give up 
externalism or self-knowledge? If so, which? Or do we treat this situation rather like a 
paradox - puzzling, but not to be taken seriously? 
If a case could be made for either of the following claims, then I think we would 
have reason to treat this conclusion as a paradox. The first is that the considerations in 
favour of incompatibilism are the same considerations that favour Cartesian scepticism, 
so that we cannot consistently take incompatibilism seriously without taking scepticism 
seriously. The second is that these same problems will prevent someone who is not an 
externalist being able to explain how self-knowledge is possible. In what follows, I will 
examine and dismiss the case for each of these claims. In the next section, I will examine 
whether we ought to give up externalism or self-knowledge. 
I will begin by showing why these claims, if correct, should lead us to consider 
incompatibilism as simply a paradox. If we could show that the incompatibilist is simply 
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bringing the same considerations that underwrite scepticism to bear on self-knowledge, 
then this might give us a reason not to take the outcome seriously. Stroud says this: 
I would grant - indeed insist - that philosophical scepticism is not something we 
should seriously consider adopting or accepting. 76 
If, like Stroud, we feel that scepticism about the external world ought not to be adopted, 
or accepted, and if the reasons that underwrite scepticism underwrite incompatibilism, 
then we would have some reason not to take incompatibilism seriously. If these 
considerations are indeed analogous, then consistency requires we treat one the same as 
the other. 
Alternatively, if it could be shown that the problems raised by the Achievement 
and Consequence Problems would apply also to philosophers who deny externalism, then 
these challenges would not have established that externalism and self-knowledge are 
indeed incompatible; merely, rather, that self-knowledge is hard to explain. If it is not 
only the externalist who has trouble responding to these problems, then we have no 
reason to think that it is in virtue of his externalism that he faces difficulties in explaining 
self-knowledge. As such, the lack of a robust compatibil ism here need not suggest that 
there is a problem with holding externalism to be true for a philosopher committed to 
self-knowledge. Rather, there may simply be a problem with accepting self-knowledge. 
There are certainly similarities between the standard sceptical challenge and the 
Achievement Problem - as I remarked in Chapter I. Both arguments rely upon the 
possibility of error that we cannot rule out, to undermine knowledge of the sort in 
question. The sceptical challenge argues that because we cannot rule out the possibility 
that our perceptions are in some way deceived, nothing we accept on the basis of our 
perceptions can count as knowledge. The Achievement Problem argues that because we 
cannot rule out the possibility of a slow switch, we cannot accept that any beliefwe hold 
about an occurrent belief or desire where a kind-dependent term like "water" is part of its 
propositional content, can count as knowledge. Both arguments, in this way, commit 
themselves to the same strict epistemic requirements. 
76 Stroud (I 984B, p.!). 
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Yet it is certainly unclear that anyone convinced by the Achievement Problem 
need be committed to scepticism, or vice versa. There are options available in response to 
the sceptic, that are not available in response to the Achievement Problem. Also, there are 
means of arguing against the Achievement Problem, which cannot be used against 
scepticism. 
In Chapter 2 [ argued that one cannot refute the Achievement Problem on the 
grounds that the slow-switching case is not a relevant possibility. I argued that this 
position is committed to an implausible account of self-knowledge; namely, that it is 
possible for a rational agent to be mistaken regarding his occurrent beliefs. This is 
implausible, because from the first-person perspective, questions of our occurrent beliefs 
are transparent to questions of truth - so, if I can assess what it is I think is true of the 
world, then I can know what I occurrently believe. Hence, if I am questioned about 
whether I believe that p, I can answer correctly, by considering whether or not I thinkp is 
true. In this way, any person capable of assessing what he thinks is true of the world has 
available a means of correctly judging what he occurrently believes. A change in his 
surrounding environment cannot be understood to detract from this. 
There is no such limitation in responding to the sceptic - it is not implausible to 
maintain that my beliefs about the external world can be right or wrong, depending upon 
the environment around me. Indeed, this seems quite likely; in a normal world, when I 
form beliefs based on sense experience, they will for the most part be correct. [fthe world 
around me is as I take it to be, then my belief that the sun is shining will be true. If the 
world around me is in fact an illusion created by an evil demon or a mad scientist, then 
my belief that the sun is shining will be false. 
In this way then, there are prospects avai lab le for refuting scepticism that are not 
available for refuting the Achievement Problem; one can run an argument claiming that I 
need only rule out relevant alternatives to my knowing that the sun is shining, in order to 
know that the sun is shining, or anyone of the various contextualist solutions available77• 
Yet, because these options all admit ofa context in which my apparently well-justified 
belief that the sun is shining is false, without severe psychological breakdown, these 
77 For some examples, see DeRose (I995) and Dretske (2003). 
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solutions can offer no analogous response to the Achievement Problem. One need not be 
committed to scepticism if one accepts the Achievement Problem. 
This would also work the other way. Earlier in this Chapter, I argued that the 
general concerns regarding transcendental arguments as responses to scepticism, need not 
apply to a transcendental argument for self-knowledge. The problem with Burge's 
argument was that it was committed to an implausible understanding of the epistemic 
requirements for knowledge of content, so that it was not clear whether it would be more 
reasonable to treat the argument as a reductio of one of its premises (externalism is true) 
rather than accept it as a transcendental argument for its conclusion. However, a 
transcendental argument using premises that are more clearly undeniable could in 
principle provide an acceptable solution to the Achievement Problem. 
Finally, even ifanyone endorsing the Achievement Problem was committed to 
scepticism, the incompatibilist could always rely upon the Consequence Problem to 
generate worries. As I argued in Chapter 2, Burge's account seems the best available 
response to the Consequence Problem. This response claims that I do not need to know 
much about the content of my belief, in order to know what its content is. So it does not 
follow from my knowing that I am thinking that "water is wet" to my being able to 
conclude that there is water in my environment. As I argued in this Chapter, the reason 
Burge can offer us for why we ought to consider this lower epistemic requirement 
knowledge, rather than belief, is based on his transcendental argument, and this argument 
does not provide us with a good reason to accept these low requirements. 
As such, iithe Achievement Problem were indeed too similar to scepticism to be 
taken seriously, the incompatibilist nonetheless has the Consequence Problem available. 
There is no obvious link between the Consequence Problem and external world 
scepticism at all , so there is no good case to be made for why one cannot accept the 
Consequence Problem without accepting scepticism. It is thus no great loss even if the 
incompatibilist were to be forced to abandon the Achievement Problem. 
It is also not clear how either the Achievement or Consequence Problems could 
apply to a non-externalist. As I remarked in Chapter 2, it is only upon the assumption the 
contents of our thoughts can be wide that either the Achievement or Consequence 
Problems threaten self-knowledge. The Achievement Problem argues that possible 
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unnoticed environmental changes threaten our knowledge of the content of our thoughts. 
But if our thought content is not taken to depend upon the environment in the way 
externalism maintains, then possible unnoticed changes in the environrnent cannot 
threaten self-knowledge. If thought content is taken to be narrow, however, then it would 
not change if the environment were to change. Hence the sort of possibility of error raised 
by the Achievement Problern cannot apply to anyone who thinks that thought content is 
not dependent upon the environment. 
The Consequence Problem serves as a reductio of self-knowledge only if we 
assume that having certain thoughts entails that certain environmental conditions obtain. 
Ifwe deny that thoughts are dependent upon the environment in the way externalism 
maintains, then it would not make sense to suggest that if I am thinking that "water is 
wet", then I must be in an environment that contains or did contain water. This only 
makes sense if we maintain that my thought content depends upon my physical 
environment. lfwe deny this, the Consequence Problem, too, will not pose a problem for 
self-knowledge. 
There may be other problems that threaten our ability to know our thoughts, 
regardless of whether or not externalism is true. However these problems, whatever they 
are, must be seen as different from the Achievement and Consequence Problems. If one is 
not an externalist, one can plausibly maintain both that we possess self-knowledge, and 
that the arguments offered by the Achievement and Consequence Problems are correct. 
In this way then, the two claims I considered which could conceivably support our 
treating incompatibilism as merely a paradox, are incorrect. In the absence of any other 
plausible reasons, I conclude that we have no reason to think the correct response to 
incompatibilism is to treat it like a paradox. In the next section, I will consider whether 
we ought to give up self-knowledge or externalism as a result of an unanswered 
incompatibilism. In this section I will also conclude th is dissertation. 
(V) Implications: Self-Knowledge and Externalism Revisited 
In this section , I argue that of the two, externalism ought to be given up rather than self-
knowledge, on the grounds that scepticism about se lf-knowledge seems at least as 
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difficult to take seriously as, ifnot more so than, scepticism about the external world. 
Externalism, while plausible, is not as undeniable as self-knowledge. 
However, I do not recommend that we accept the falsity of externalism just yet. I 
also argue that this is only the position we should take given the unavailability of a 
response to incompatibilism. It is certainly not the case that no reason can be given for 
why we should accept our judgements about our thoughts to count as knowledge. This 
can be done; what must be established is that Burge's lower epistemic requirements for 
knowledge of content are not as implausible as they first appear. There may indeed be 
some independent good reason to accept this claim - nothing I have said entails that no 
such reason exists, just that, as it stands, it is not at all clear (at least not to me) what this 
reason could be. 
As I said in Chapter I, that we possess self knowledge is highly plausible 
intuitively speaking; that I am thinking that the sun is shining, and that I know I am 
thinking this seems as undeniable, if not more so, than the claim that I have hands, and 
that I know I have hands. The denial of self-knowledge is at least as unpalatable as the 
denial that I have knowledge of the external world. 
In Chapter 2, I examined Burge's argument for why critical reasoning requires 
self-knowledge. If this argument is right, and I think it is, then if we are to give up self-
knowledge, then we must give up the idea that we possess the ability to reason critically. 
To deny that we are capable of critical reasoning, is to deny the legitimacy of our 
epistemic practices of examining our beliefs, and altering them as we see appropriate. 
Critically engaging with our beliefs, it would follow, adds nothing to the epistemic status 
of these beliefs. 
It must be accepted that arguments threatening the legitimacy of such practices 
cannot be taken seriously outside the philosophy seminar room. Just as arguments 
claiming we have no justification to hold any of our beliefs about the external world do 
not cause us to drop or suspend such beliefs, claims that we do not know, or have no 
justification for our beliefs about what we are thinking could not lead us to cease forming 
beliefs on this basis. Even if we were to accept these arguments are correct, it would be a 
bizarre response for anybody to cease to make claims about what they are thinking, in 
response to such arguments. 
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The fact that scepticism is in this manner hard or impossible to take seriously has 
led some philosophers to treat the sceptical argument less seriously. As Stroud says: 
Many would dismiss scepticism and defend not taking it seriously on the grounds 
that it is not a doctrine or theory any sensible person would contemplate adopting 
as the truth about our position in the world. It seems to them too frivolous or 
perverse to concentrate on a view that is not even a candidate in the competition 
for the true or best theory as to how things are. 78 
Stroud, as we have seen, agrees that we should not seriously accept scepticism, but thinks 
that it is still important to deal with scepticism, as the argument it uses has - he thinks -
no obvious answer. This, Stroud thinks, is troubling, not because it means we ought to 
give up the idea that we have knowledge of the external world, but rather that it is not at 
all obvious how we can have it. The task in responding to the sceptic, on Stroud's view, 
becomes one of explaining how we have self-knowledge - whether we have it, is no 
longer at issue. We can assume that we do, but to explain how we do requires an answer 
to scepticism. 
Though, even if thi s is the case, scepticism presents us with the embarrassing 
situation of us having an argument we cannot faule9, with a conclusion we cannot - or 
even should not - believe. This situation is to be avoided - which is why philosophers 
like Dretske have accepted "abominable" and "bizarre" theses as a means of finding fault 
with its premises. 
Ifwe were to take the Achievement and Consequence Problems to undercut self-
knowledge, we wou ld be faced with the same embarrassing situation. But in response to 
these problems we have an easier and less embarrassing option available - deny 
externalism. 
I will not go into the strengths and weakness of externalism here. I remarked in 
the first chapter that the general form of externalism discussed here derives its 
78 Stroud (19848, p. 2). 
19 Assuming that we cannot fault it. There will be many, naturally, who do fault it for some reason or 
another. Yet nonetheless , there will be a great deal of perfectly rational people who have read skepticism, 
accepted the argument as correct, but find themselves unable to take the conclusion seriously. 
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plausibility from the Twin Earth thought experiments - externalism seems the best way 
of accommodating our intuitive response to those sorts of cases. Nonetheless, the cost of 
abandoning externalism here is not as great as the cost of abandoning self-knowledge; the 
falsity of externalism does not threaten our ability to critically reason, nor is it a 
conclusion we cannot believe outside the seminar room - in the way that we cannot 
believe the falsity of self-knowledge outside the seminar room. 
As I also remarked, the intuitive support for externalism is diminished if indeed 
externalism can be seen to have intuitively bizarre consequences - like either we lack 
self-knowledge, or we have to accept Burge's low requirements for knowledge of 
content. Given these consequences, the case for externalism loses some of its force. In 
this way, it seems best to agree with McLaughlin and Tye when they say, and I repeat: 
we find [self-knowledge] sufficiently compelling that if Twin Earth externalism is 
incompatible with this privileged access thesis, that is a powerfully compelling 
reason for rejecting Twin Earth externalism. Indeed, were we ourselves to come 
to think that the incompatibilist view is right, we would reject Twin Earth 
external ism. 80 
Yet it is not clear where this would leave us, in our views regarding mental content. In 
this dissertation I have not examined whether we can generate any independent reason for 
accepting that mental content be narrow in the way required for se lf-knowledge. The 
considerations I have mentioned here simply suggest that given the lack of any good 
reason to accept Burge's low epistemic requirements for knowledge of content, ifwe 
want a plausible account of self-knowledge, then it seems as we require that mental 
content be understood to be narrow. This then would be an argument for narrow content 
from self-knowledge. But to make a successful case for narrow content would require 
more than this . !fwe can make no sense of mental content construed narrowly, then this 
will diminish the plausibi lity of thi s argument. Ifmental content can only be plausibly 
understood to have wide content, accepting narrow content on the basis of an argument 
for self-knowledge would be problematic. 
80 McLaughlin & Tye (1998, p. 289). 
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Further, and as I have said, externalism and self-knowledge are not the only 
competing options here - there is also the possible option that we accept Burge' s low 
epistemic requirements for knowledge of content. This wou ld allow us to keep both self-
knowledge and externalism. But again it is not clear whether we can generate any 
independently plausible grounds for this - these requirements simply appear to be totally 
different from the requirements we place on every other kind of knowledge; the fact that I 
know so little about my mental content, on Burge's view, threatens the plausibility of his 
claim that I know what it is. Knowing so little about anything else uncontroversially 
implies that I do not know what it is. Why should this not be the case regarding content? 
In this way, giving us reason to accept these requirements will require a substantial 
amount of work. 
In this way, I argue that it is not yet clear that our best response to the arguments I 
have provided would be to abandon externalism. That is an avenue that should be 
exp lored, but what must also be explored is whether we can generate any plausible 
account of knowledge of content that is consistent with Burge's lower epistemic 
requirements. But it seems our best option will be to accept one of these two avenues-
either we accept a theory of narrow content, or we accept the lower epistemic standards 
for knowledge of content. Which of these is best will depend upon the plausibility of 
these prospective accounts. It is to the examination of such accounts, I submit, that th is 
debate should proceed. 
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